

# **Dissertation**

## **The Migration-Development Nexus- Tackling its changing paradigm**

**Merith Steinbach**

**09071970**

**European Studies 3C**

**Supervisor: M. Krijtenburg**

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**Academy of European Studies & Communication Management**

**The Hague University of Applied Sciences**

## **Executive Summary**

The surge of the interest in the migration-development nexus and the sheer “euphoria” about the potential positive impact of migration on development in origin countries, has also entered EU - level politics on migration. Yet it seems unbelievable that only about one decade ago the effects of migration on development have been viewed to be of negative nature. Considering that a reversal of the MDN paradigm from scepticism to euphoric optimism took place, this dissertation aims to answer the question why and how the MDN paradigm has changed so suddenly. In order to have a comprehensive understanding of the migration-development nexus the dissertation illuminated its paradigm from three different angles: firstly, the theoretical perspectives and policy measures concerning the positioning of migration in development cooperation were assessed. Secondly, it was examined how and why the MDN entered the centre stage of the international attention, identifying as well the main argumentation lines within the debate. Thirdly, the emergence and development of the MDN within EU External Migration Policy was investigated by applying a discourse analysis of EU documents.

The dissertation reveals that numerous factors, ranging from certain external events to general developments such as the improvement of communication technologies, have played a role in the development of the migration-development nexus in the international debate as well as in European politics. Furthermore, the paradigm change of the nexus within EU policies shows certain parallels to the argumentation lines presented by international organisations. This suggests that the EU has been “pushed” to incorporate migration-development related issues on the Migration Policy agenda.

Although the greatest attention was drawn to “remittances” up to now, as it is the most tangible and measurable of the developmental impacts, the other elements of the migration-development nexus are nowadays considered to be of equal importance. The “brain drain” debate has turned into a “brain gain” debate as the significance of social remittances was acknowledged. Next to the concepts of “brain circulation” and “circular migration” to promote international knowledge and skill transfer, a new dimension of the nexus, namely the role of “diaspora” and “transnational communities” has been explored. Yet, the discourse analysis reveals that the EU maintains security-centred in its approach of the nexus within partnerships with third countries. However, the events of the Arab Spring have provoked a further integration of the linkage between migration and development. This could be an important step towards partnership agreements that are beneficial as well for the origin countries.

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### **List of Abbreviations**

NGO	Non-Government Organization
UN	United Nations
EU	European Union
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
WWII	Second World War
NELM	New Economics of Labour Migration
EEC	European Economic Community
IMI	International Migration Institute
GAM	Global Approach to Migration
GAMM	Global Approach to Migration and Mobility
MDN	Migration-Development Nexus
SME	Small and medium-sized enterprises
WHO	World Health Organization
CAMM	Common Agenda on Migration and Mobility
UNDESA	United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
UNHDR	United Nations Human Development Report
GCIM	Global Commission on International Migration

HLWG	High Level Working Group
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
GCIM	Global Commission on International Migration
GFMD	Global Forum on Migration and Development
ODA	Official Development Aid

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## Introduction

In the light of globalisation, mobility has become one of the main and most important features of our time. The advances of transportation and communication technologies enable an ever easier circulation of goods, capital and knowledge across borders. In fact, also human mobility has increased. According to the United Nations Population Division (2010) the number of international migrants almost tripled from 75 million in 1960 to 214 million in 2010. At first, this increase seems to be enormous. Yet, in context to the world population in these years, the rise of migratory flows results to be relatively minor from 2,5% in 1960 to 3% in 2010. Rather than the statistical data, it is the public perception of migration movements that has changed profoundly. Images of illegal migrants trying to cross the Strait of Gibraltar with their overloaded fishing boats, which almost break apart, circulate regularly in the media. Although migration has always been an intrinsic part of humanity, it is more visible and evident today than it has ever been before. Even though the reasons for migrating are manifold and not mutually exclusive, they are traditionally associated to socio-economic disparities between countries, especially between the developed North and less developed South.

Therefore, it might not seem surprising that since the new millennium, the linkage between migration and development, namely the migration-development nexus (MDN), has enjoyed sudden and increasing attention throughout the international community. This surge of interest incorporates a new perspective on the dynamics linking migratory and developmental issues. In this view, migration from poor countries to the developed North is not only a consequence of under-development; but it can also contribute to the improvement of the social and economic conditions of the origin country. Accordingly, migrants themselves can play a crucial role in development processes of their home country through the transfer of remittances and skills as well as through the engagement in transnational communities.

In the last decade, this widespread recognition of migrants' positive potentials led to a near "euphoria" in civil society, international organisations and national governments alike. The new interest generated an enormous amount of publications addressing the relationship between migration and development<sup>1</sup>. In the same way, more and more

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<sup>1</sup> such as the *United Nations Human Development Reports*, the *World Bank's Financial Development Reports* as well as the publication "*Moving out of Poverty – Making Migration work*"

international conferences were organised with the aim to maximize developmental benefits of international migration for both receiving and sending countries. In the preparatory report for the UN High Level Dialogue on Migration and Development in 2006, the Secretary-General of the United Nations described the new interest in the issue as followed:

“The potential for migrants to help transform their native countries has captured the imaginations of national and local authorities, international institutions and the private sector. There is an emerging consensus that countries can cooperate to create triple wins, for migrants, for their countries of origin and for the societies that receive them”. (General Assembly, 2006, p. 5)

This dissertation will focus on the *emerging consensus* related to the second “win”, namely the developmental impact of migration on origin countries. The *consensus*, as portrayed by the Secretary-General, can also be described as *conventional wisdom* – “something that is so obvious that it does not even need arguing” (Castles, 2008, p. 3). A conventional wisdom is, therefore, a view or belief that is shared by most people. As we have seen, the new “hype” about the relationship between migration and development - as Hein de Haas, Co-Director of the International Migration Institute – described it, is founded on the assumption that migration can play a positive role in the development of the home country.

This conventional wisdom about migrations’ positive potentials has even entered the European Union’s migration policy already. Migration, traditionally seen in politics as something that has to be controlled or restricted, is now regarded as a “tool”. Within its so-called “global” or “comprehensive” approach to migration, the EU has incorporated the idea that migration, if managed well, can have a positive developmental impact on the origin countries.

Considering today’s overwhelmingly optimistic perception of migratory influences on development, it seems almost unbelievable that not even 15 years ago, a pessimistic view has dominated this debate: “migration and development – nobody believes that anymore!” (Massey, et al., 1998, p. 260) – as argued by an official from the International Labour Organisation (ILO) in 1996. According to the pessimistic view, migration deprives developing countries of their most valuable human resources, which are desperately

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*better for the poor People*” by the Department of International Development (DFID), just to give a few examples.

needed in order to progress towards economic growth and social stability - called brain drain (A)<sup>2</sup>. Nowadays, the emphasis lies on the skills and money gained by migrants abroad, which – if transferred to the home country – can generate positive developmental effects, named brain gain (A). This extreme shift seems to be even more surprising when taking into account as well that “data and evidence [...] in regard to international migration and development are insufficient and often deficient” (UNDESA, 2010, p. 2). If empirical evidence about the positive effects of migration on development is weak, the question rises instinctively why there has been such a shift of the conventional wisdom from pessimism to this intense optimism in the last couple of years.

Thus, this dissertation aims to research the evolution of the MDN paradigm within the international community and especially within EU policy in order to understand the current “hype” about the nexus. As such shifts do not take place within a political vacuum, it seems crucial to not only look at the paradigm change itself, but also at the social and historical factors influencing it. Therefore, the main research question is: *Which historical and institutional factors influenced the emergence and the development of the migration-development nexus in EU policy and how has it been conceptualised and instrumentalised since then?*

In order to understand the complexity of the MDN, this paper will examine three different angles of the paradigm: firstly, the theoretical perspectives; secondly, the contemporary debate and argumentation presented by scholars and international organisations; thirdly, the policy approaches within the European Union. With regard to today’s quite one-sided focus on the positive potentials of migration on the social and economic development of less developed countries, this dissertation aims at giving a more “balanced” view on the issue, examining both, the negative and positive perspectives. This research can therefore be of importance to non-governmental organisations (NGOs), international organisations and policy makers, as it provides a more comprehensive insight into the paradigm of the MDN and its development in the policy discourse. Furthermore, a better understanding of the ideas and concepts that underlie EU migration policies and the factors that influenced its framing also enables to view the developments also from a more nuanced or even critical perspective.

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<sup>2</sup> The (A) indicates that a detailed definition of the term can be found in Annex 1.

## Research Methodology

### 1. *Theoretical framework*

The theoretical framework of this dissertation relies on the assumptions of discourse theory, which also inform the methodology used in order to tackle the changing paradigm of the migration-development nexus in EU policy in chapter III. As scholars define discourse differently, it is not easy to offer a commonly accepted definition; nevertheless, some general characteristics of discourse can be identified. Based on the work of Michel Foucault (1926-84), who influenced the notion of discourse in social science to a crucial extent, David R. Howarth, one of today's leading scholars of political discourse theory, describes discourse as "historical specific systems of meaning which form the identities of subjects and objects" (Howarth, 2000, p. 9). Discourse theory as such is built on the assumption "that all actions, objects, and practices are socially meaningful and that these meanings are shaped by the social and political struggles in specific historical periods" (p. 73), as Fischer (2003) puts it in more comprehensive words in his book *Reframing Public Policy: Discursive Politics and Deliberative Practices*.

Discourse, in this sense, does more than simply reflect the world like a mirror; it rather constructs and organizes the understandings of social reality. To illustrate it with an example: "a tree can be an object of intrinsic natural beauty, an obstacle to building a motorway, or a unique ecosystem" (Howarth, 2000, p. 9) depending of the social and historical context that gives meaning to it. This, however, does not mean that everything is reduced to language or that it entails scepticism about the world's existence. On the contrary, it circumvents any kind of scepticism and idealism as this very idea of discourse logically implies that we all live within a world of meaningful practices. Thus, different discourses lead to different understandings, which result in a different perception of social reality (Fischer, 2003).

Drawing on the social constructionist perspective, politics and public policy are formed by socially interpreted meanings and understandings, which are "produced and reproduced through discursive practices" (Fischer, 2003, p. 13). An illustrative example how this theoretical approach can look like in the real world is the notion of social problems, which public policies try to address. Originally, it was assumed that social problems, like for instance drug addiction, existed because they were the direct result of objective, visible and identifiable social conditions. Nowadays, however, constructionists view them as the

product of claims about the presumed conditions made by social and political activists to public authorities (Fischer, 2003; Howarth, 2000; Keller, 2011).

The recognition of multiple realities is also crucial for the understanding of the debate on the migration-development nexus. All ideas and concepts within this debate are constituted by a certain social reality within a specific context. Therefore, a discourse analysis does not aim to evaluate, falsify or verify the political arguments; but rather it intends to show how “objects and actions come to be socially constructed and what they mean for social organization and interaction” (Fischer, 2003, p. 73). Under the following subheading, the methods of the discourse analysis applied within this dissertation will be described in more detail.

## ***2. Methods, Structure and Materials***

Fischer (2003) puts it in a nutshell: “the use of political language is the clue to the speaker’s view of reality at that time” (p. 53). Consequently, in order to grasp the paradigm of the MDN in EU policy, a discourse analysis is applied to tackle the “realities” or the assumptions underlying the MDN.

In general, the way in which a discourse analysis is conducted depends on the focus and the desired outcome of the specific research. In this case, the aim of the analysis is to show how the MDN was constructed in EU policy at certain points within the time frame. The results will enable me to compare these “constructions” with each other and make a statement about its development. The definition of discourse, which I adopt within this dissertation, is the one of Maarten Hajer, professor of Political Sciences and Public Policy, who earned international recognition with his analysis of public environmental discourses. He defines discourse as “specific ensemble of ideas, concepts and categorisations that are produced, reproduced and transformed to give meaning to physical and social relations” (Hajer, 2005, p. 300). Consequently, the discourse analysis of the chosen EU documents aims at tackling the ideas, concepts and categorisations, namely the paradigm of the MDN in EU migration policy.

Clear and comprehensive guidelines and techniques used for the analysis of the migration-development nexus, are not only an important tool for the author, but as well crucial for the reader in order to understand the approach of the analysis (Keller, 2011). Therefore, Boswell’s concept of narratives is applied as a discourse analysis technique. Christina Boswell is one of the most well-known contemporary experts in EU migration

policy and applies her narrative analysis comprehensively throughout her whole book in order to analyse the “ideas [...] that inform how policymakers frame policy problems and how they conceive of the impact of their interventions on these” (Boswell & Geddes, 2011, pp. 72-73). Acknowledging the added value of her concept, the discourse analysis technique of this dissertation will be based on the three main components of Boswell’s definition of narratives: “the factual beliefs espoused by policy-makers and others engaged in political debate about the *causes* and *dynamics* of the problems they are seeking to address, and about *how policy could impact these dynamics* [italics added]” (Boswell, Geddes & Scholten, 2011).

It is to remind the reader of the limits of this research. Discourse analysis is often applied in order to conduct research on power-structures and the connected decision-making processes as well. However, although I will link the discourses to their historical and social context in which they have been produced - as by definition discourse does not happen within a vacuum – the focus of this research is to assess development of the **MDN paradigm** in EU policy. The examination of the context entails the description of the social and the historical moment in which the documents have been produced. That will allow naming the factors that provoked the shift of conventional wisdom. The following table outlines the research questions, the methods and the resources used in each of the chapters.

**Table 1: Overview of the Research Methodology and Organisation of the Paper**

Questions	Research Method	Materials	Chapter
<b>What are the aspects of the theoretical and policy debates on the MDN in retrospection?</b>	Fundamental research	Peer reviewed journal articles, books	I
<b>How and why did the MDN emerge in the international debate?</b>  <b>Which ideas, concepts and arguments shape the international debate on the MDN?</b>	Fundamental research	Peer reviewed journal articles, statements, publications and conference reports of IOM, OECD, World Bank, DFID, and the UN	II
<b>How did the MDN emerge in EU external migration policy?</b>  <b>What was the historical and institutional context?</b>	Fundamental Research	Official EU documents and secondary literature: Journal articles and books	III.1.

<p><b>How is the MDN constructed and instrumentalised within the EU discourse and in which way did its paradigm change?</b></p> <p><b>What were the factors influencing the change?</b></p>	<p>Discourse analysis, (narrative analysis),</p> <p>comparison based approach</p>	<p>Official EU documents</p> <p>(The Tampere agreement, the Seville European Council conclusions, The Hague and Stockholm programme as well as several key Communications of the European Commission)</p>	<p>III.2.</p>
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The first and the second chapter can be seen as “preparatory” foundation that makes the discourse analysis of the MDN in EU migration policy in chapter III possible in the first place. In order to be able to tackle the MDN’s paradigm within EU discourse, a fundamental understanding of its concept and aspects is essential. Therefore, three different perspectives of the nexus will be examined before starting the discourse analysis. Firstly, chapter I will assess the theoretical perspectives of the MDN and their development. Thereby special attention is drawn on the historical context in which they developed, namely the related trends in social and development theory as well as migration policy in Europe. Secondly, the contemporary debate and argumentation presented by scholars and international organisations will be examined. This assessment is important in order to tackle the different contemporary ideas and assumptions regarding the links between migration and development within the international community. Thirdly, as ideas and assumptions “do not float freely” (Lavenex & Kunz, 2008, p.443), chapter III.1. outlines the historical and institutional context in which the MDN has emerged and developed in EU migration policy.

The term “**migration-development-nexus**” was first used by Ninna Nyberg-Sorensen, Nicholas Van Hear and Poul Engberg-Pedersen in 2003, and refers to the complex range of links between migration and development. As the concept of migration is very broad, this dissertation focuses exclusively on **international labour migration** and is therefore to be differentiated from forced migration or refugee migration (See Annex). **Development**, on the other hand, will be used in its broader sense: the improvement of social, economic and political dimensions of peoples’ lives. However, the political aspect of development will only play a marginal role within this dissertation.

The secondary literature, which principally contains books and peer reviewed journal articles, was collected by mainly using the following e-databases: *Academic Search Premier (EBSCO)*, *JTOR* and *Questia Online Library*. Additionally, further literature, especially on EU migration policy and discourse analysis, was acquired in the *Universitäts- and Landesbibliothek Münster* (Germany). The publications of the UN, the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the World Bank as well as of the DFID were

retrieved from the organisations' respective websites. The publications were chosen according to their topicality and importance to the MDN's development in the international debate. Further information on statistical data and documents concerning the *High Level Dialogue on Migration and Development* were obtained from the UN Department for Economic and Social Affairs' website on International Migration. Finally, the official EU documents, used for the discourse analysis, were acquired from the e-Library on the European Commission's Home Affairs website. The explanation and justification of the specific selection of EU migration policy documents is to be found in the third chapter.

For the realisation of this paper, the academic publications of many different and well-known experts have been used. In the following, only the most important experts will be introduced. Within this dissertation, the publications of **Hein de Haas**, Co-director of the International Migration Institute (IMI), are of great importance, as he has specialized almost exclusively on the relationship between migration and development in theory and policy for years. Therefore, he can be seen as one of the most significant contemporary scholars in this field of research. Special attention was also drawn to the writings of **Prof. Stephen Castles**, an Honorary Research Associate and former Director of the International Migration Institute (IMI) at the University of Oxford. As policy adviser for governments, international and intergovernmental organisations, he is one of the most established scholars in contemporary migration studies. Concerning the theoretical perspectives, the work of **Prof. Thomas Faist** is also of considerable importance. He is professor at the University of Bielefeld and one of the leading specialists in the studies of transnationalism related to migration and development issues. One of the most cited works in the theoretical literature about the MDN is the book *Worlds in Motion: Understanding International Migration at the End of the Millenium* from several migration studies experts (**Massej, et al.**, 1998). It is one of the first publications that presented a more balanced view on the MDN; hence it is of great significance to this paper as well.

Besides **Christina Boswell's** publications, the works of the following experts were consulted on information related to EU migration policy. **Dr. Ferruccio Pastore**, Director of the International and European Forum for Migration Research (FIERI) and chair of the Migration and Integration Forum of the European Policy Centre (EPC), is one of the leading scholars in European migration policy issues. **Prof. Dr. Sandra Lavenex** is an internationally well-known professor for International Politics at the University of Lucerne, Switzerland, amongst others. The research of **Katleen Newland**, Co-founder of the Migration Policy Institute (MPI), concerning the policies embracing the interrelation

between migration and development is also considered to a respectable extent within this dissertation.

## I. The Migration-Development Nexus: Retrospection on Theory and Policy

The “boom” in the last few years or “the new surge of interest” in the correlation between migration and development, how Kathleen Newland (2007) described it, is by no means a new discourse. Looking at earlier researches and policies relevant to migration and development, it is discernible that the interrelation of these two phenomena has been subject of discussion for a considerable time. Over the years, the debate swung “back and forth like a pendulum, from developmentalist optimism in the 1950s and 1960s, to structuralist and neo-Marxist pessimism and scepticism over the 1970s and 1980s” (de Haas, 2007, p.3), to more optimistic views based on pluralist approaches, as outlined in the table below:

**Table 2: Main Phases in Research and Policies towards Migration and Development**

Period	Research community	Policy field
Until 1973	Development and migration optimism	Developmentalist views; capital and knowledge transfers by migrants would help developing countries in development take-off. Development strongly linked to return.
1973–1990	Development and migration pessimism (dependency, brain drain)	Growing skepticism; concerns on brain drain; after experiments with return migration policies focused on integration in receiving countries. Migration largely out of sight in development field, tightening of immigration policies.
1990–2001	Readjustment to more subtle views under influence empirical work (NELM, livelihood approaches, transnationalism)	Persistent skepticism and near-neglect of the issue; “migration and development, nobody believes that anymore” (Taylor <i>et al.</i> , 1996a:401) further tightening of immigration policies.
>2001	Boom in research, in particular on remittances. Generally positive views. De-linking of development with return.	Resurgence of migration and development optimism under influence of remittance boom, and a sudden turnaround of views: remittances, <i>brain gain</i> , diaspora involvement as vital development tools. Development contribution of migration often framed within renewed hopes put on circular and return migration.

Source: Hein de Haas (2010, p.230)

According to Hein de Haas (2010), however, “the recent re-discovery of the migration-development nexus tends to go along with a certain neglect of the insights that have emerged from the decades of prior research and policy experience” (p. 228). Consequently, the underlying ideas, concepts and arguments which shaped and still shape scholar’s debates have to be examined in order to fully understand the complex

relationship between the two phenomena. Furthermore, to be able to analyse the paradigm shift to today's migration-development optimism, it is crucial to comprehend the views that have dominated the debate before. Nevertheless, a detailed description of the theoretical concepts of development and migration over the decades would go beyond the scope of this dissertation.

Therefore, this chapter will only roughly outline the dominant theoretical trends and policy measures concerning the positioning of migration within development cooperation. These trends will be presented in the chronological order portrayed in Table 2, ranging from MDN optimism after WWII and MDN pessimism in the 1970s/80s to more pluralist approaches in the 1990s. The "boom" of the MDN in the new millennium will then be examined in the second chapter.

### ***1.1. Migration and development optimism***

During the 1950s and 1960s, the development optimist view, based on historical and evolutionist assumptions about modernisation, dominated in development theory. With the demise of colonialism, they expected the new emerging countries in Africa, Asia and the Middle East to quickly follow the Western path of economic development. Hence, migration economists of the neo-classical theory strand perceived labour migration as an intrinsic part of modernisation. They assumed migration to be the outcome of geographical differences in labour supply and demand and the related wage differentials. The decision to relocate is taken by the individual migrant on the basis of rational considerations with regard to the costs and benefits (Bakewell, 2007). According to this theory, emigration causes a decrease of labour supply in capital-poor countries, which results in the increase of the wages. In reverse, the wages in capital-rich countries decrease as consequence of the growing immigrants' labour demand (Massey, et al., 1998, p.18). In other words, migrant flows are generated by the existence of economic inequalities, which are then "corrected" through migration and the resulting optimal distribution of production factors.

In this "balanced growth" perspective, migration is seen as being beneficial to sending and receiving countries at the same time and to help "equalise wages and conditions in underdeveloped and developed regions, leading towards economic equilibrium" (Castles, 2008, p. 5). The more balanced the wage levels are, the more migration declines. Simplifying this overwhelming positive concept of the correlation between migration and development results in the so called "virtuous circle":

**Box 1: “Virtuous Circle”**

Beginnings of development in poor countries → Migration →  
Enhanced development → Trend to income equilibrium and  
elimination of the ‘root causes’ of migration → Less migration.

Source: Castles (2008, p. 6)

The dominant development-migration optimists during the 1950s/60s paid special attention to return migration and the bounded remittances (A) as positive drivers for innovation and change in sending countries. In this sense, remittances, meaning not only the money brought back home but as well new ideas, entrepreneurial spirit and knowledge, are understood to have a rather indirect effect on economic growth. That is to say, the “guest workers” would re-invest in enterprises and diffuse modernisation in their origin countries after their expected return (de Haas, 2007; Faist, 2009; Massey, 1996).

The view that migration is beneficial for receiving and sending countries was shared as well on the governmental level of many countries. The industrial core of Europe (Belgium, France, Germany and the Netherlands) recruited Italian labour in the 1950s/60s in order to fill their “labour gaps”, caused by the economic boom. After the growing equalisation of the conditions within the European Economic Community (EEC), intra-community mobility declined, leading to more and more labour migration from outside (Stalker, 2002). Especially the governments of Morocco and Turkey, which regarded labour export as a driving force for national development, encouraged their citizens to migrate to the global North (Castles, 2008).

However, the long-term outcomes of this strategy were usually disappointing, as the expected rapid economic growth and modernisation in developing countries did not take place. The recession going along with the oil shock and the general paradigm shift in development theory towards pessimist views changed as well the dominant perspective on migration for the next two decades.

### ***1.2. Migration and Development Pessimism***

In the late 1960s, optimistic views on modernisation processes were more and more challenged “under the combined influence of a paradigm shift in social and development theory towards historical-structuralist and dependency theory” (de Haas, 2007, pp. 232-233). Based on neo-Marxist assumptions, the dependency theory rejected the earlier argument that developing countries can follow the Western path of economic development and modernisation, “if only because the earliest industrialised nations


changed the landscape for those that followed” (Handelman, 2010, p.19). That is to say, developing countries cannot compete with the well-industrialised countries that, therefore, possess the dominant position “controlling” the world economy. This logically results in a dependency towards these capitalist nations. According to the theory, this very dependency was established already with Western colonialism and is further perpetuated through the unequal terms of trade - making rich countries even richer, whereas resources of poor countries are increasingly being exploited. Emmanuel Wallerstein’s “World System Theory” is probably the most well-known theoretical approach of this school. His theory divides the world into the industrialised core and the dependent peripheries (Handelman, 2010).

Accordingly, the dominant perception of migration and its role within development processes also changed. Migration was now seen as the “flight from misery”, which comes along with the “asymmetric growth”, namely the growing inequalities in the capitalist world system. The emigration of human capital, that is to say “people with education, skills, entrepreneurial spirit, and a willingness to take risk” (Massey, et al., 1996, p. 186) was seen to have comparable effects to those of capital flight, for instance declining productivity and wages. Hence, migration viewed as “brain drain” (A) from origin countries further deepens the spatial disparities, because the poor countries lose their valuable human capital, which is then exploited as cheap labour by the capital accumulating countries (Massey, et al., 1998).

Remittances also play a role in the historical-structuralist view of migration. However, their positive meaning within neo-classical theories has been reversed arguing that the money would not be used in a “productive” way most of the time, but rather spent on “conspicuous consumption” like imported goods or luxury housing. Furthermore, the greater consumption and land purchase, caused by remittances, are supposed to produce inflationary pressures. Thus, remittances, as a part of migration, would only contribute to deepen inequalities within sending countries and make whole parts of society dependent on these money-flows (Bakewell, 2007; de Haas, 2010). Besides, the pessimist approach examined socio-cultural effects of migration as well. It is not surprising that this aspect of migration was also interpreted in a negative way: The revealing relative success and wealth of migrants and their new “life-style” are considered to cause “changing rural tastes, lowering the demand for locally produced goods, increasing the demands for imported urban or foreign produced goods, and thereby increasing the general costs of living in sending communities” (de Haas, 2010, p. 239).

To conclude, according to the pessimist views, the effects of migration on development are crystal clear: “migration undermines the prospects for local economic development and yields a state of stagnation and dependency” (Massey, et al., 1998, p. 272). As migration leads to underdevelopment, which then, in turn, produces more migration and so forth, this theory is often illustrated with the vicious circle, also called the “migrant syndrome”:

**Figure 1: Conceptual Framework of the “Migrant Syndrome”**



Source: Hein de Haas (2010, p.235)

Also, the attitude towards migration and development on the policy level was subject to change. The oil crisis in 1973 and the growing unemployment resulted in a perception change of migration: considered before as intrinsically positive for both, sending and receiving countries, now, the arguments were turned upside down like in the scholarly debate. Brain drain and the creation of dependencies increasingly constituted the subject of discussions concerning migration. The economic downward trend in Europe, a hostile social climate and the theoretical perspective of growing immigration, evoked by increasing dependencies, transformed the public notion of migration to the point of being regarded as a “problem” that has to be “solved”:

“It was the recession following the oil shock of 1973 that signalled a more general reversal across Europe and all governments effectively closed the doors to further labour immigration and expected guest workers to leave. These workers had, however, by now put down roots and preferred to stay.” (Stalker, 2002, p.153)

Consequently, migration and development were from now on rather treated as two separate subjects. The Western focus concerning international migration shifted to a receiving-country-perspective and centred more on the integration of the now “permanent” guest workers than on the developmental consequences for origin countries.

Looking at both theories at the same time, it becomes clear that they could not be more contrastingly extreme in their argumentation. The neo-classical theories put an emphasis on the individual migrant, who takes the rational decision to relocate on the basis of an evaluation about the costs and benefits. In this view, migration equalises countries’ conditions in long term through optimal distribution of labour and invested remittances of return migrants. In contrast, the historical-structuralist view sees migration as the consequence of the social structure, which “forces” migrants to leave. According to this theory, migration further deepens the already existing inequalities and dependencies, which then, in turn, lead to even more migration.

Logically, the question arises which theory was actually right. This is difficult to answer as empirical findings are extremely contradictory. In some cases, the effects of migration on social and economic dimensions of development are positive; in other cases, migration is likely to have a negative or no influence at all. “This cannot just pertain to differences in paradigmatic orientation – leading to different interpretations of similar empirical data – political ideology or methodology, but also relates to real, existing differences” (de Haas,

2010, p. 240). It follows that the real-life correlations between migration and development are too heterogeneous and complex to fit into an overall theoretical mechanism that determines and predicts the impacts of migration on development. Consequently, a paradigm shift away from optimist and pessimist approaches towards more pluralist and hybrid theories took place, which led, in turn, as well to a more optimistic view again.

### ***1.3. Pluralist Approaches to Migration and Development***

The so-called pluralist approaches gained momentum in social theory from the 1980s and 1990s onwards. Whereas neo-Marxist and structuralist theories put high emphasis on, as the name already suggests, structural constraints to explain worldly dynamics, neo-classical approaches tend to centre on agency. Pluralist approaches, which acknowledge the heterogeneous correlation between migration and development, re-theorised the old dichotomy of the grand theories by linking and taking into account both, human action approaches and broader processes in social structures. According to Castle (2008), that allows a more holistic understanding of the interaction between migration and development.

A detailed description of all these theoretical approaches would go beyond the scope of this dissertation. Nevertheless, it is important to understand the new trends, as they reflect how empirical data is collected, which methodologies are used and which questions are posed in the contemporary research of the nexus. This information, in turn, gives an insight into the elements that are usually expected to define the (negative and positive) interactions between migration and development. In the following, only the most significant strands of the pluralist approaches will be roughly examined, namely the New Economics of Labour Migration, Transnationalism and the “migration hump”. Finally, the dominant political attitude towards migration and development during the 1990s will be outlined.

The **New Economics of Labour Migration** (NELM) remains within the economic paradigm set of the neo-classical assumptions on income maximisation and long-term equalisation of conditions. However, it rejects the neo-classical idea that the migrants’ decision to relocate is taken by the individual alone, disregarding not only other reasons to migrate but as well migrants’ belonging, such as to social groups and families. The NELM emphasizes the household and the family as decision-making unit, which use migration as a strategy to not only increase the income security but as well to spread the risks. Therefore, remittances play a direct role, benefitting the family and community

members. Furthermore, they can help to overcome constraints in the often-problematic market situation of sending countries. Generally, this approach hence allows positive and negative development outcomes, depending as well on the investment climate in sending countries (Castles, 2008; Taylor, 1999).

Like the NELM, many pluralist theories seem to take households or communities as the primary basis of analysis, which can also be interpreted as the middle ground between the structure and agency approaches. However, it also constitutes a response to new findings that could not be captured without a household approach: Migrants, although living abroad, tend to maintain closer ties with their sending communities than before, as transportation and communication technologies advanced rapidly within the last decades.

Recognising that migrants can live and act transnationally by keeping ties to their families, migration studies, which used to focus more on assimilation and integration issues, have undergone a “transnational turn”. **Transnationalism** approaches “transnational communities” that constitute social spaces beyond national borders. It challenges the clearly defined concepts of “origin” and “destination”, and sees the successful integration of migrants in receiving countries not as a “loss” or a “drain” (Nyberg-Sorensen, Van Hear, & Engberg Pederson, 2002). On the contrary, as migrants often maintain transnational ties “on a personal, collective and organisational level” (Faist, 2008, p.39), they can have an influence on development-related issues by transmitting money, knowledge and ideas. “This also exemplifies that the development contribution of migration is not necessarily linked to the return of migrants. Migration and economic activities at the origin are not mutually exclusive, but are in fact combined” (de Haas, 2010, p. 246)

Within these theories, including the neo-classical and neo-Marxist approaches, the assumptions about the driving forces that lead to migration are very different. Yet, they are all related to a certain extent to the level of “development”. Accordingly, migration is the consequence of unequal economic and social conditions like for example salaries, labour opportunities or social structures. Logically, it follows that the reduction of these inequalities would eventually lead to a decrease of migration. However, there is considerable evidence that contradicts this assumption:

“... international migrants do not come from poor, isolated places that are disconnected from world markets, but from regions and nations that are undergoing rapid change and development as a result of their incorporation into global trade, information, and production networks. In the short run,

*international migration does not stem from a lack of economic development, but from development itself [italics added]*. (Massey, et al., 1998, p. 277)

This approach is widely known as “**migration hump**”, as it suggests that the improvement of economic and social conditions leads to a temporary rise of migration flows – a migration hump. The increase of wealth, the improvement of transportation infrastructures and communication technologies as well as the establishment of networks enables a growing proportion of the society to migrate (de Haas, 2007). Of special importance is the new notion of “relative” poverty which, compared to “absolute poverty”, allows people to migrate in the first place. Whereas migration flows tend to increase steeply with the initial improvements of conditions, only later they start to decrease gradually when development processes have already improved to such an extent that the advantages of migration are not that obvious anymore. It can last very long until this stage is reached. “In the Italian case, for instance, more than a century passed [...] to the reversal of Italy’s migration balance, from negative to positive, sometime in the early 1970s” (Pastore, 2003, p.2). Therefore, the emigration flows in context to the country’s development level over time, describes an inverted U-curve (Olesen, 2002).

Looking at these pluralist approaches, the view on the interaction between migration and development was now a more nuanced one than before. However, scepticism persisted to be the dominant view, as Massey et al. (1998) described it in the following:

“Because neither theory nor data have been up to the task of evaluating migration’s effects on economic development, and have largely asked and answered the wrong questions, we believe the prevailing view is unduly pessimistic and harsh”. (p. 272)

Also, Western European governments and officials generally remained sceptical concerning the positive linkages. Here to name is the comment of the ILO official in 1996: “Migration and development - nobody believes that anymore” (Massey, et al., 1998, p. 260). However, this sceptical view has to be seen in context with the ongoing pessimist view on migration itself. As outlined before, Western European countries started to implement measures to restrict immigration and encourage return migration as a consequence of the Oil Crisis in 1973. Fears about massive immigration waves from Eastern Europe after the end of the Cold War further politicised migration as a security issue in Europe in the 1990s (Castles, 2008). It was under these circumstances that the European countries’ concerns about migration issues entered the intergovernmental level of the European Union. These developments, however, will be described in greater detail in the third chapter.

Even though the “conventional wisdom” during the 1980s and 1990s was pessimistic in its perception of the migration-development nexus, there have been some isolated attempts to link migration and development in a positive way. “One of the oldest initiatives on migration and development” (Bakewell, 2007, p. 24), namely *co-development*, is to be mentioned here. The initial version of this French policy explicitly encouraged African migrants to return and reintegrate in their origin countries by providing funds that could be used for local initiatives. It is often argued that this policy “connotes a reversal of the nexus and has led us back to a more optimistic view” (Faist, 2009, p. 42) because it incorporates the specific connection between migrants and investments in development. Nevertheless, the concept of *co-development* has also been criticised widely as a mere means to encourage return migration (see Castles, 2008).

In this chapter we have seen the ideas and argumentation that underlie the MDN and how its paradigm has changed in theory and research as well as in European politics. The changes within the discursive debate on the correlation always mirrored the broader paradigm shifts on the political level as well as in social and development theory. The neo-classical theory reflects the views of the dominant development optimism in the 1950s/60s. It sees migration as an intrinsic driver for modernisation, which will equalise the conditions between countries through optimal distribution of labour and invested remittances that were brought along by return migrants to their origin countries. In this way, the economic development caused by migration would then lead to a decline of migration. The historical-structuralist theory, on the other hand, views migration as a process that deepens the dependencies and inequalities within the capitalist world, as it deprives poor countries of their human capital, whereas the industrialised nations use their cheap labour to grow even richer. In this view, remittances only lead to “unproductive” consumerism while the growing impoverishment causes even more migration. The shift from optimism to pessimism took place not only together with the general paradigm shift in development theory, but as well with the u-turn of the EU countries’ migration policy. Migration was suddenly seen as a “problem” that had to be limited and controlled. Finally, the two extreme views were combined in more nuanced, pluralist approaches, which consider both agent and structure in their research. Yet, national policy makers remained sceptical towards the link between migration and development. Nevertheless, it was under these conditions that the migration-development optimism re-emerged abruptly at the beginning of the millennium.

## **II. The Migration-Development Nexus in the contemporary international Debate**

The following chapter will examine how the migration-development nexus has moved to the centre stage within the international community. Furthermore, the contemporary international debate on the specific elements of the nexus will be reflected by looking at the arguments presented by international organisations and researchers. On the one hand, it will help to identify the historical factors that influenced the emergence of the MDN within the international community. On the other hand, it is crucial to examine the contemporary conceptualisation of the nexus to be able to analyse its paradigm in EU policy in the third chapter.

At the end of the 1990s, European governments faced a rising labour shortage and the demographic problem of an aging society, which “made labour migration a more palatable topic at the national level across the EU” (Weinar, 2011, p. 3). However, migration issues still remained rare on the international level. In September 2000 for instance, the international community identified eight general development goals, the UN “Millennium Development Goals” (MDGs). These goals and the 18 targets to be achieved within 15 years, however, were famously silent on migration issues.

It was in 2001 when the “hype” about the positive impacts of migration on development started spreading along NGOs, international organisations and political actors. Suddenly, the interaction between migration and development and especially the positive potentials of remittances moved to the centre of attention and were increasingly addressed in conferences and reports. The International Labour Organisation (ILO), for example, organised the conference *Making the Best of Globalization: Migrant Worker Remittances and Micro-Finance*. Also, the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), which had recognised the positive effects of migration already during the 1960s and 1970s, plays a major role in today’s discourse with its journal *International Migration* and the annual conferences called *International Dialogue on Migration*. In 2003, on the UN Secretary-General’s initiative, the *Global Commission on International Migration* (GCIM) was founded with the aim to investigate possible interactions between migration and other issue areas, such as development. In the same year, the World Bank started to acknowledge the positive potentials of remittances as well and organised the *International Conference on Migrant Remittances*. However, a major turn in the international migration

discourse was the GCIM's report *Migration in an interconnected World* in 2005, emphasising the positive effects which migration can have on development:

“International migration has the potential to play a very positive role in the process of human development, bringing benefits to people in poorer and more prosperous countries alike. The Global Commission on the International Migration underlines the need for the international community to maximize these benefits and to capitalise on the resourcefulness of people who seek to improve their lives by moving from one country to another”.  
(GCIM, 2005, p.5)

This report gave path to numerous, more specialised conferences such as the *Conference on Migration and Development* in Brussels in 2006, organised by IOM, World Bank and the EU Commission with the purpose to discuss related policy options. The *High Level Dialogue on Migration and Development* initiated by the UN, in turn, laid the ground for the annual *International Global Forum on Migration and Development* (GFMD). The latter can be seen as one of the most significant platforms of intergovernmental exchange on migration and development nowadays (Lavenex & Kunz, 2008; Nuscheler, 2012, Stalker, 2002).

Obviously, the relationship between migration and development enjoyed increasing attention on the international level. Since the new millennium, a shift from scepticism about positive impact of migration on development towards a near “euphoria” within the international community took place. It is notable that within these discourses, the perception of migration also changed considerably: “It is no longer simply seen as a failure of development but increasingly as an integral part of the whole process of development with a potentially important role to play in the alleviation of poverty” (DFID & World Bank, 2003).

This new positive image is founded on the assumption that the benefits of migration on sending countries exceed the negative consequences. Generally, scholars agree that this “hype” started when the sheer and unexpected magnitude of the remittances to developing countries was realized:

“A brief chapter in the World Bank's *Global Development Finance* in 2003 created a sensation when it pointed out that, globally, remittances to developing

countries amounted to \$72.3 billion and surpassed the level of all official development assistance". (Newland, 2007, para. 7)

During the 1990s, whereas Official Development Aid (ODA) declined, remittances had more than doubled. Although the increase can be explained as well by the improved statistical and reporting systems – in 2011 \$372 billion of remittances were estimated (World Bank, 2012) – money flows sent through informal channels are not included in this number (Skeldon, 2008). In many developing nations, the amount of these money flows are as high or even higher than other sources of external funding, such as foreign direct investments (FDI) or ODA, whereas remittances, in general, are less pro-cycle, meaning that in times of crisis more money is sent home in order to support the families (IOM, 2010).

However, remittances' effects on development issues are not undisputed. The IOM, the World Bank and the OECD emphasise the positive macro-economical effects on origin countries, such as the improvement of the balance of payments, the debt service and the ability to import. Also neo-classical arguments stressing the trend towards labour market equilibrium in specific sectors are presented (IOM, 2010; Nuscheler, 2012; OECD, 2011). Having an eye on the MDGs' imperatives, the question how remittances can help to reduce poverty has moved to the centre of attention. The majority of the assessments share a positive view on the potentials of remittances to alleviate poverty. Accordingly, remittances have proved to flow directly, without any national or international bureaucracy, to the poor where they cover the costs of basic needs such as food, health care, education and housing (DFID, 2007). In the international debate, remittances seem to have taken the place of the best possible "bottom up" approach to effectively redistribute financial welfare among people in developing countries (de Haas, 2005, Skeldon, 2008).

Yet, the migration process is a financial burden and, thus, it is selective. That is why most migrants from the underdeveloped world come from middle-income countries. For this reason, remittances do not necessarily benefit the poorest members of a population, nor the poorest countries (Nyberg-Sorensen, Van Hear, & Engberg Pederson, 2002). Besides the fact that remittances are obviously important in order to improve the living conditions of households, remittances' effects on sustainable economic growth are more difficult to catch. Only a very small percentage of the remittances seem to be invested in job-creating or income-earning activities (Newland, 2007). The growing consumption of imported goods in developing countries stands in the centre of criticism as well, as it

would result in missing production incentives on the domestic markets. Next to the claims of provoking a “remittance-dependency” and a loss of individual initiatives, some scholars warn about the resulting disparities:

“The assumption is that remittances flow back to the country as a whole. However, the large preponderance of remittances flows back to a small number of town and villages. The immediate effect is to reinforce or increase inequalities between rural and urban areas and between rural areas”.  
(Skeldon, 2008, p.8)

Apart from these criticisms about seeing remittances as the ultimate “development mantra”, which are quite familiar from earlier discussions, the brain drain argument is also part of the contemporary debate, as some countries notably face a growing outmigration of their high skilled labour forces. The case of Manchester has become notoriously well known, as more Malawian doctors and nurses work there than in Malawi. Critics emphasise in particular the sending countries’ loss of human capital, education costs and tax revenues as well as the loss of the innovative potentials that could bring economic and political change (GCIM, 2005).

However, brain drain’s net developmental losses are hard to estimate. On an economic level, it has been pointed out that it depends on how big the country’s reservoir of skilled employees is, in order to tell whether the effects of emigration are negative or positive. If the skilled labour supply exceeds the demand in a developing country, it can benefit from remittances and a relief of the job market, as outlined before. However, even if this is not the case, it has been observed that sending countries could still benefit from emigration. Many researchers argue that brain drain should be seen in a more nuanced way (UNHDR, 2009). This leads us directly to the second new insight on which the pillars of the contemporary optimism about the migration/development relationship are built on.

The “resourcefulness” of migrants, as the GCIM report in 2005 referred to, does not only include financial, but also social remittances. Social remittances, as defined in the Human Development Report, are “ideas, practices, identities and social capital that flow back to families and communities at origin” (2009, p. 79). With the acknowledgment of the importance of these social remittances, the “brain drain” debate turned into a “brain gain” debate. The most popular reference of such a brain gain process is the Indian case: After the massive outmigration of IT specialists in the 1980s, many returned to India and used their foreign-gained capital, know-how and contacts to create their own IT businesses.

These developments definitely contributed to the software production boom in India today (Hunger, 2011). Accordingly, emigration is not necessarily a permanent loss of skilled labour, but it can rather be a delayed benefit if the acquired expertise, experience or attitudes lead to innovations, investments or trade relations in origin countries. Social remittances cannot only have economic effects on the origin countries' economy, but migrants can as well "act as agents of political and social change if they return with new values, expectations and ideas shaped by their experiences abroad" (UNDP, 2009, p.81).

The term "brain circulation" became very popular in this context and serves increasingly as the basis of potential policies. In this view, the migrants' return is essential in order to "bring back" what was gained abroad. As a consequence, return is the last of the 3 R's – Recruitment, Remittances, Return – which are, according to the report of the Conference on Migration and Development, the determining factors that can lead international migration to a win-win-win situation for receiving countries, origin countries and migrants (IOM, European Commission, & World Bank, 2006). Of course, the benefits of return migration have already been theorised by neo-classical economists. However, something has changed in the contemporary debate: return does not have to be permanent or even physical in order to affect development:

"In addition to definitive reintegration, return can also be temporary and repeated (circular migration) or even "virtual" (internet communication); the question is what use has been or can be made of the skills and knowledge of the migrants (brain gain) and possibly of their willingness to invest". (IOM, European Commission, & World Bank, 2006, p.13)

This change of perspective was brought about by the transnational approach, as outlined in the first chapter. Basically, it unites financial and social remittances as well as the skilled migrants in the concept "transnational communities" or "diaspora" (A). These social spaces of close linkages between people living in two or more countries can be "leveraged" "not only as a source of remittances, investments, and political contributions, but also as potential "ambassadors" or lobbyists in defence of national interests abroad" (Nyberg-Sorensen, Van Hear, & Engberg Pederson, 2002, p. 15). The importance of these communities for home country development is increasingly acknowledged as they are more familiar with the social and cultural conditions and needs of their country than the – prepared in a crash-course - workers of the "aid industries" (Nuscheler, 2012). To conclude it with the words of Thomas Faist (2009):

“Thus, in recent years the notion of migrants’ return as an asset to development has been completed by the idea that even if there is no eventual return, the commitment of migrants living abroad could be tapped, not only, for example, through hometown associations but also through informal diaspora knowledge networks”. (p. 43)

In general, although they are not mutually exclusive, two different strands of focus can be identified concerning the international organisations. First, there is the purely financial perspective centred on the effects of remittances, which builds the focus of the World Bank and the OECD. Secondly, a broader social and rights-based perspective on migration is represented by the UN, the IOM and the ILO. Instead of only focussing on the economic aspects, these organisations pay for example special attention to migrants’ working conditions, social impacts of migration and commit themselves to the general right to relocate and the right to develop (see UNDP, 2009). It is hard to say which perspective is currently dominating. It is clear, however, that the economic impact of migration on development remains the most tangible as statistical data about remittances is easier to collect and to measure (Collyer, 2011). Nevertheless, it has to be pointed out that in every contemporary research or statement, without exception, it was referred to the fact that “Migration is never a panacea or substitute for good economic policies” (Taylor, 1999, p. 81) or Official Development Assistance in order to promote sustainable development.

Up to now we have seen, how the migration-development nexus entered the centre stage of interest in the international community. However, the question why it captured such an attention remains to be answered. Four different claims about the reasons that provoked the new interest in the MDN are named and differently combined in scholarly literature. Firstly, the rise of remittances and secondly, the uncertainty about the negative impacts of high skilled labour migration sensitized the international community for the developmental consequences of migration on sending countries (de Haas, 2006; Newland, 2007). Thirdly, in the search for financial sources for promoting the MDGs, the international community recognized the potentials of remittances to alleviate poverty (Lavenex & Kunz, 2008). And finally, as the “migration pressure” from the South to the North seems to be growing, the political demand to “manage” or “control” international migration increased on the European level (Faist, 2009; Skeldon, 2008). Whereas the magnitude of the remittances undoubtedly played a major role in pushing the nexus into

public attention, it is probably a mixture of all these reasons that provoked such “euphoria”.

To summarise the acquired insights of this chapter, the migration-development nexus produced a sudden “boom” of interest since 2001 and is ever since subject to contradictive debates. The magnitude of remittances provoked an excitement throughout the international community about the positive impact of migration on development. Whereas it was still sceptically regarded as a negative force for development in the end of the 1990s, the new optimism about the nexus is based on the assumption that the benefits of migration on sending countries exceed the negative consequences. The linkage started to be explored progressively in conferences, reports and research in order to identify the certain aspects of the relationship between the two phenomena. Remittances constitute a major part of the new “euphoria” and as they are viewed to have been a less bureaucratic instrument to fight poverty as well as to finance education, housing and labour-creating investments. Yet, there is also a lot of criticism concerning the effects of remittances on development such as the fragmentary distribution of remittances that do not benefit the poorest regions. The former “brain drain” debate has turned into a “brain gain” argumentation, which acknowledges the potentials of social remittances. However, the only very new aspect of the MDN in the contemporary debate are the positive effects that “diaspora” or “international communities” can have on development of their home country. Looking at the ideas, concepts and argumentation which shape the contemporary debate, the relationship between migration and development still seems “unsettled”, as Papademetriou (1991) described it. As statistical data and research are often contradictive, there seems to be no right or wrong in this debate.

### **III. The MDN in the External Dimensions of EU Migration Policy**

This chapter examines at first how the MDN emerged in EU migration policy and further elaborates on the institutional factors that influenced its emergence. In the second part, a discourse analysis of EU documents is applied in order to tackle changes in the conceptualisation and instrumentalisation of the MDN in EU policy.

#### ***III.1. The Emergence of the MDN in EU Policy***

To begin with the words of Ferruccio Pastore (2007): “At the roots of contemporary migration policies, in western Europe, is a *parallel process of unilateral closure* and of “*securitisation*” of international human mobility” (p. 2). With this, he refers to the radical shift in the framing of migration policy among western European countries provoked by the Oil Crisis in 1973, as outlined already in the first chapter. Almost immediately, the large scale recruitment of “guest workers” was stopped. Migration management, initially a matter of cooperation between sending and receiving countries, then turned into a “home affairs” issue of each destination country (Pastore, 2007). Accordingly, a range of unilateral measures to restrict and control immigration were implemented. However, these policies did not generate the intended results but rather an increase of different immigration flows, namely illegal immigration, asylum seekers and family reunions. The consequence was an even more pessimistic view of migration, as Christina Boswell states in the following “Migration issues had become highly politicised in the most European states from the 1980s onwards, and political parties were competing for electoral support with promises to restrict unwanted migration” (2003, p. 621). However, these promises could not be fulfilled as the end of the Cold War and the civil conflicts taking place in the former Yugoslavia provoked even more flows of asylum seekers.

As unilateral measures to control migration demonstrated obvious shortcomings, it is not surprising that the EU states sought for alternatives to manage immigration flows in a better way. At the same time, the Schengen Agreement and the perspective of free movement within the EU borders further raised the perceived need for additional measures among MS to compensate the “loss” of border control (Boswell, 2003). Against such a background, EU states recognised that channels for dialogue and cooperation with the main origin states had to be established in order to control migration movements into the European Union better. These EU cooperation efforts with third countries became known as the “external dimension” of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA).

This “*external projection* of European migration policies” (p. 2), as Ferruccio Pastore (2007) calls it, incorporates two rather different approaches that aim to limit flows into the EU. The first is usually described as the “externalisation” of traditional measures of migration control in order to harden the external frontiers. In this view, cooperation has the aim to engage origin and transit states in intensifying border controls, striving against illegal migration and human trafficking (Boswell, 2003). Also readmission agreements (A) that legally bind sending or transit countries to readmit illegal migrants that reached the EU coming from their territory form a part of the “externalisation” of migration policy. This securitised approach can be linked to the common perception of migration as a “threat” at that time. “Given the securitization of these migration management issues in public discourse in most EU countries, the focus on police and control instruments seemed entirely appropriate” (Boswell, 2003, p. 624).

The second approach to EU external migration policy, however, is based on quite contrasting assumptions of how to counteract migration flows into the EU best. It stresses the importance to *prevent* migration flows by tackling the “root causes” that force or encourage people to leave their country, such as poverty or conflicts. These “preventive” or “root causes” approaches, which aim to reduce the migration pressure through better development assistance, constitute the first linkage between migration and development on European supranational level (Pastore, 2003). The tensions between the externalisation and preventive approaches within the external dimension are commonly described as the “migration-security nexus” in scholarly literature. However, this paper focuses on the migration-development nexus within EU policy and thus, the attention will be drawn to the “root causes” approach and its further development.

Many political actors within a liberal or human rights context saw the “root causes” approach as a serious alternative to the security and control-centred approaches. The logic was to manage migration in a way that would not endanger human rights and freedoms, by making it possible for potential migrants to stay in their country of origin. This approach can be seen as a result of growing frustrations about the limits of the classical instruments of migration control that can protect refugees only in a *palliative* and *reactive* way (Boswell, 2003). The shift towards preventive measures can also be linked to the historical happenings following the collapse of the Soviet Union, namely the dramatic events in the former Yugoslavia (European Council, 1992). “The changed international political context and increased interest in preventing conflict and

humanitarian crisis placed humanitarian intervention and preventive activities on the spectrum of feasible strategies for migration management” (Boswell, 2003, p. 626).

The Edinburgh Council of 1992, bearing the events in the former Yugoslavia in mind, formulated explicit factors that could prevent migration pressures including the preservation of peace, human rights, democracy and liberal trade policies to enhance economic conditions. Furthermore, it was stressed to investigate “ways of removing causes of migratory movements” (European Council, 2012, p. 43). The European Commission Task Force on JHA also showed its support of preventive approaches. The Commission (1994) demanded,

“...that immigration and asylum policies are fully integrated into the Union's *external policies*, and that the various external policy instruments available to the Union are used to address the *root causes* of those pressures. That could involve action at a number of different levels such as in the areas of trade, development and co-operation policies, humanitarian assistance and human rights policies [italics added]”. (para. 11)

As the quotation suggests, the approach of the European Commission to unite several different policy fields in the external dimension in order to tackle the root causes still is, like the Council's approach, very broad and unspecific about the explicit steps. Yet, it is proved that the Council and the Commission recognised the need to broaden the securitised approach to migration policy with preventive, developmental measures.

Despite these early efforts to address the root causes of migration, the role of preventative approaches has been marginalised until the end of the 1990s. This was mainly the result of the institutional framework under the Maastricht Treaty. The JHA was incorporated in the third, intergovernmental pillar, which was a reason why the Commission's power had been very limited with regard to immigration and asylum policy during the following years. The marginalisation of the root causes approach was further reinforced by the European Council's lack of political initiative and will (Boswell, 2003). Still, the meetings of the JHA officials in the Council of Ministers remained traditionally security and control orientated in their approach to immigration:

“Caught up in the logic of expanding control instruments, they had little incentive to hand over the task of migration management to development and foreign affairs officials. These latter, meanwhile, were keen to avoid what

many saw as an attempt to subvert development goals through targeting development to prevent migration flows". (Boswell, 2003, p. 626)

The "externalisation of migration control" approach, however, was challenged from 1997 onwards, as the Amsterdam Treaty brought about some institutional change. The JHA was implemented into the so-called first pillar, turning from intergovernmental to supranational structures. As a consequence, the Commission gained further legal competencies in immigration and asylum policy, such as the role to negotiate agreements with third countries (Boswell & Geddes, 2011).

Another institutional change towards preventive approaches took place in 1998 with the creation of the High Level Working Group (HLWG) in the Council of the European Union. Initially, its task was to analyse how to reduce the increasing number of immigrants by taking the causes of migration into account as well. The resulting reports were presented in 1999 at the Tampere European Council, the first out of three five-year work plans, which build the framework for migration and asylum policy (Boswell & Geddes, 2011). Enabled by the legal changes of the Amsterdam Treaty, the Tampere agreements finally laid the formal foundations for the external dimension of migration and asylum and established the "partnerships with countries of origin" linking migration and development issues.

As the Tampere conclusions constitute the official beginning of the linkage between migration and development in European policy, the discourse analysis will start with this crucial document and continue in a chronological order with the key documents that constitute the most important milestones of the external dimensions (See Box 2 below). The Communications of the Commission are "soft measures", that is to say "they are not legally binding on the EU member states because there is no monitoring and enforcement measures to ensure that they are implemented and complied with" (Chou, 2006, p. 6). Yet they represent the EU's efforts to develop a common European approach to conceptualise and instrumentalise the complexities of the migration-development nexus. These Communications build the basis for any EU policy concerning the MDN and hence play an essential role for the analysis of the EU's approach to the MDN. The 11 documents used for the discourse analysis were selected according to their importance and preference in secondary literature about the MDN (Collyer, 2011; Chou, 2006; Lavenex & Kunz, 2008; Pastore, 2007; Weinar, 2011).

**Box 2. The Development of the MDN in EU External Policy: Documents used for the Discourse Analysis**

The three five-year work plans, which build the framework for migration and asylum policy :

1. **Presidency Conclusions of the Tampere European Council** 15 and 16 October, 1999.
2. **The Hague Programme** - Strengthening Freedom, Security and Justice in The European Union, 3.3.2005, C 53/1.
3. **The Stockholm Programme** - An open and secure Europe serving and protecting Citizens, 4.5.2010, C115/1.

Conclusions and Communications

*Presidency Conclusions of the Seville European Council 21 and 22 June 2002* , Brussels 24.10.2002, 13463/02 POLGEN 52.

Commission Communication of 3.12.2002 to the Council and European Parliament: Integrating migration issues in the European Union's relations with third countries COM (2002) 703 final

Commission Communication to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions of 1 September 2005 – Migration and Development: some concrete orientations COM (2005) 390 final

Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament – Priority actions for responding to the challenges of migration – First follow-up to Hampton Court. COM (2005) 621 final

Brussels European Council Presidency Conclusions , Brussels 30.01.2006, 15914/1/05.

Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament – The global approach to migration one year on: towards a comprehensive European migration policy COM (2006) 735 final

Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions of 16 May 2007 on circular migration and mobility partnerships between the European Union and third countries COM (2007) 248 final

Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions - The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility , Brussels 18.11.2011, COM (2011) 743 final

***III.2. The Migration-Development Nexus in EU Discourse***

After of the theoretical perspectives and the contemporary debate about the MDN in the first and the second chapter, a short introduction of the MDN's emergence in EU policy was provided. The following discourse analysis will complete the picture of the nexus. It will analyse how the MDN was conceptualised and instrumentalised within the mentioned

EU documents produced in the time frame from 1999 to 2011. By analysing the discourses in a chronological order, shifts can be examined more efficiently whilst the historical context will be taken into account as well. As the documents are too different in nature, their structure and content will not be compared directly to each other. Rather, the focus will be drawn exclusively on the MDN related discourse. In order to keep a better overview, the names of the analysed documents are highlighted in bold letters.

As mentioned before, the **Tampere European Council Conclusions** - the action plan for the time from 1999 until 2004 - laid the foundation for the “partnerships with countries of origin” that encompasses the new “comprehensive” approach to migration. This comprehensive approach acknowledges the relationship between migration and development by addressing (although not explicitly) the “root causes” of migration:

“The European Union needs a comprehensive approach to migration addressing political, human rights and development issues in countries and regions of origin and transit. This requires combating poverty, improving living conditions and job opportunities, preventing conflicts and consolidating democratic states and ensuring respect for human rights, in particular rights of minorities, women and children”. (European Council, 1999, pt. 12)

Accordingly, specific economic, social and political conditions that should be addressed in migrants sending countries were identified. This is supposed to be achieved through a better coordination of the external dimensions of migrant and asylum policy as well as through partnerships with the sending countries:

To that end, the Union as well as Member States are invited to contribute, within their respective competence under the Treaties, to a greater coherence of internal and external policies of the Union. Partnership with third countries concerned will also be a key element for the success of such a policy, with a view to promoting co-development”. (European Council, 1999, pt. 12)

Hence, the aim of these actions is to promote “co-development”. Yet, this is a very vague concept, which needs to be defined in more detail. This has also been acknowledged in the *Commission Communication on Migration and Development* six years later, stating that “...[the communication] will also help to refine the concept of co-development enshrined in the Conclusion of the Tampere European Council” (European Commission, 2005a, p. 2 ). Apart from the very broad concept of “partnerships” with origin countries, no further indications of measures to promote development can be found in the conclusions. It is discernible that these partnerships are dominantly mentioned in regard to readmission agreements, which proves the overarching dominance of security-centred approaches.

A new step towards defining the relationship between migration and development was taken in the **Seville European Council** in 2002. The initiative of the Spanish and British Prime Ministers to make development aid dependent on third countries' efforts on migration control was ultimately rejected (Lavenex & Kunz, 2008). However, a certain level of conditionality between border control and development cooperation remained in the final Conclusions. It includes that every partnership agreement between the EU and third countries compulsorily includes clauses on joint migration management and readmission (European Council, 2002). "Insufficient cooperation by a country could hamper the establishment of closer relations between that country and the Union" (European Council, 2002, para. 35). Further it was specified that if "a third country has shown an unjustified lack of cooperation in the joint management of migration flows" the Council could take "measures or positions" under EU's foreign policy or other European policies "while honouring the Union's contractual commitments but not jeopardising development cooperation objectives" (European Council, 2002, para. 36).

These efforts to link development policies to the management of migration flows can clearly be seen as part of the securitarian approach of the migration-development nexus. It sees development as an "instrument" or a "tool" to control and manage migration flows, rather than as a goal in itself. This is very clearly demonstrated in the following passage, worth to cite in length:

"The European Council considers that combating illegal immigration requires a greater effort on the part of the European Union and a targeted approach to the problem, with the use of all appropriate instruments in the context of the European Union's external relations. To that end, in accordance with the Tampere European Council conclusions, an integrated, comprehensive and balanced approach to tackling *the root causes* of illegal immigration must remain the European Union's constant long-term objective. With this in mind, the European Council points out that closer economic cooperation, trade expansion, development assistance and conflict prevention are all means of promoting economic prosperity in the countries concerned and thereby *reducing the underlying causes of migration flows* [italics added]". (European Council, 2002, para. 33)

Several elements can be highlighted here: Firstly, it calls for an enhanced integration of the "comprehensive" approach to migration, which constitutes the "balanced" approach together with the security-orientated view. The comprehensive approach, as outlined in the Tampere Conclusions, specifically addresses the social and economic conditions within sending countries. Secondly, these conditions, in turn, are explicitly identified by the Council as the "root causes" of migration which makes under-development the main cause of migration movements. Thirdly, by tackling development issues, through

measures to promote “economic prosperity”, the root causes will be reduced, which logically also leads to the decrease of migration flows. It goes without saying that the Seville Conclusions instrumentalised the linkage between migration and development in order to manage migration flows. This understanding of the MDN can be summarised in a one-sided, “coercive” approach of the nexus, incorporated in the often used catch words “more development for less migration”.

It is not surprising that the conditionality linking development aid with migration control cooperation was met with disapproval by governments of developing states (Chetail, 2008). In December 2002, the Commission therefore presented the **Communication on Integrating Migration Issues in the European Union's Relations with Third Countries**. With this Communication the Commission shows its intentions to find an overall approach to the external dimensions of migration policy, or in other words, a roadmap for the cooperation with third countries in order to reduce migration pressure. When referring to the Seville Conclusions, it does not renounce the goals to link partnership agreements with migration control measures. However, it is explicitly stated that the “overall framework of the development policy is by now well established and should not be overturned by new priority areas” (European Commission, 2002, p. 21). That is to say that the EU’s development policies should not have the aim to manage migration in a better way.

Apart from this, the Communication constituted a shift of the migration-development nexus debate within the external policy. The first out of two parts is dedicated to the interrelation of migration and development, while the second discusses the financial resources of migration management with third countries. It indicates that the nexus started to be considered more seriously than before. The first part includes descriptions of push and pull-factors of migration as well as a subsection that counteracts the view that the reduction of the “root causes” would immediately lower migration flows. According to this “migration hump” phenomenon, emigration first increases and only starts to decrease “when the level of development in the country of origin reaches a more mature stage” (European Commission, 2002). Hence, the Commission (2002) defines it to be a *long term goal* from now on to address the “push factors that constitute part of the root causes of migration flows” in order to reduce “the timespan of the ‘migration hump’” (p. 21).

Of even greater importance is the Commission’s acknowledgement that “migration is not to be seen only as a problem, but also as an essentially positive phenomenon” (p.7). It is referred to a win-win scenario, “where sending and receiving countries as well as the

migrant him- or herself benefit from migration” (European Commission, 2002, p. 16). This obviously marked the reverse of the MDN, as not only development was supposed to have effects on migration but vice versa as well.

Two specific subjects were presented under the heading: *The Effects of International Migration on developing countries*: first, migrant remittances and second, brain circulation. A very positive introduction to migrant remittances, its importance for private households in developing countries and its “developmental potential” is presented. In support of these money flows, migrant-hosting countries are encouraged to ensure less burdensome and cheaper financial transfer systems. In the Communication, further positive potentials of migration concerning brain circulation are outlined. Although brain drain in developing countries is acknowledged as a problem, special attention is drawn to the positive effects of the ties that migrants maintain with their country of origin: “Voluntary return of migrants, both temporary and permanent, brings back accumulated amounts of financial, human and social capital into developing countries” (European Communication, 2002, p. 16). The Communication presents some broad policy goals and options regarding legal migration (k.k.) in order to counteract brain drain and support brain circulation. Yet, the new approach concerning brain circulation remains broad and unspecific. Described in detail, however, are the obligatory readmission clauses included in the partnership agreements with third countries.

In general, this Commission’s Communication marks a crucial shift from a security centred to a more “balanced” approach, as it incorporates development issues to a considerable extent: “dialogue should not limit itself to the question of how to address illegal migration and readmission [...] the European Union will systematically put the migration-development nexus on the agenda of its political dialogue [with third States]” (European Commission, 2002, p. 23). Furthermore, a shift in the understanding and instrumentalisation of the MDN from “more development for less migration” to “better migration for more development”, as Ferruccio Pastore (2003 & 2007) calls it, was notable but not yet completed. The overall goal of the partnership agreements with third countries still remained in the security-orientated bastion, namely on migration control. This did not change until 2005, when the security frame of migration policy was reconsidered as a direct consequence of “external” events.

Meanwhile, the **The Hague Programme**, the framework for migration and asylum policy during 2005-2010, was adopted. It reinforced the aim to achieve partnership agreements with third countries. However, it only referred briefly to migration-development relations:

“The European Council welcomes the progress already made and invites the Council to develop these policies, with particular emphasis on root causes, push factors and poverty alleviation” (European Council, 2005, p. 5). Nevertheless, later events in 2005 moved migration-development issues to the centre of attention within the EU.

Increasing attention to the positive potentials of migration on development within the international community (as outlined in chapter II) led to a UN High Level Dialogue in 2006. In the preparation of a common European position, which had to be presented at the conference, the Commission adopted the **Communication on Migration and Development: Some concrete Orientations** in 2005. Consequently, the EU has been “pushed” to focus on the interactions between migration and development. As it builds an illustrative bridge to the developments outlined in the second chapter, the following section of the Communication’s introduction is worth to cite at length:

“Countries and international organisations increasingly perceive migration as a phenomenon whose positive impacts in development terms can be substantial, provided that appropriate policies are in place. The migration and development nexus is one of the central issues being examined by the Global Commission on international migration (GCIM), whose report is due out by October 2005. The ‘High Level Dialogue on Migration and Development’ planned for 2006 in the framework of the General Assembly of the United Nations, is further evidence of the importance of this debate. [...] Reflecting the main issues in the global debate on migration and development [...] the Commission has identified concrete orientations for improving the impact of migration on development, with a focus on south-north migration.” (European Commission, 2005a, pp. 2-3)

So rather than “improving the impact of development on migration”, this Communication focuses on the positive potential of migration on development issues. Comparing this approach of the MDN to the one of the Seville Conclusions, it becomes clear that the nexus has been completely reversed, from *controlling* migration *through* development to *managing* migration *for* development. Furthermore, the view on the interrelations of the nexus has broadened significantly with this Communication.

Explicitly, it presents four strategies to address the interrelations of migration and development. Firstly, in order to maximise the benefits of remittances, several initiatives are considered to make the money sending process “cheaper, faster and more secure”.

Furthermore, different approaches are considered to facilitate the developmental contributions of remittances in sending countries:

“...remittances are private money and they will only flow to productive investment if beneficiaries are able to make informed choices and if appropriate incentives exist. Developing such incentives and improving the choices in receiving countries is part of a more comprehensive and long-term development approach”. (European Commission, 2005a, p. 5)

Secondly, the Commission recognized the potentials of transnational communities to play a positive role in developmental processes of their home countries. In the annex, some reference is given to already existing structures to help migrants being involved in diaspora activities. The third strategy elaborates on the concept of brain circulation and brain drain, as already mentioned in the Communication of 2002. Special attention is given to circular migration and (temporary) return of migrants, as they lead to knowledge transfer and mitigate the effects of brain drain.

“Both [circular migration and return] also foster brain circulation, which can be defined for the purpose of this Communication as the possibility for developing countries to draw on the skills, know-how and other forms of experience gained by their migrants – whether they have returned or not – and members of their diaspora abroad”. (European Commission, 2005, p.25)

However, it is pointed out that return does not have to be permanent in order to have a positive impact on development. The Commission acknowledges that “faster modes of transportation and communication [...] mean that circular migration, in which migrants tend to go back and forth between the source country and the destination country, and return migration will become increasingly widespread” (European Commission, 2005, p.25). Also ways of “virtual return” are encouraged by the Commission and implicate the engagement of diaspora members or communities.

Finally, several potential initiatives to mitigate “the adverse effects of brain drain” (p.8) are outlined including institutional partnerships, recruitment mechanisms and enhanced cooperation with sending countries. One can notice a difference between the proposed initiatives concerning remittances and the three other strategies. The part on remittances is more precise in defining the potential frameworks of action; while the sections on diaspora involvement, brain circulation and brain drain still seem to be “in progress” as the Commission lacks experience and data to define and evaluate certain possibilities. Yet, this communication is considerably more detailed and explicit in its conceptualisation of the MDN, as the former document from 2002.

Events in Ceuta and Melilla in September 2005 can be defined as “external shocks” which gave major impulses to reconsider the EU’s control-orientated approach to migration and asylum policies. Thousands of Africans tried to climb over the fences into EU territory within a couple of months only. Numerous people died or were injured. The violence of Spanish border guards and the inhumane deportations through the Moroccan authorities horrified the international community (Lavenex & Kunz, 2008). At the informal European Summit at Hampton Court on 27 October 2005, the Heads of State and Government

“called for renewed action to manage migration flows, and for the development of a series of immediate, practical actions to be taken forward in partnership with source and transit countries” as “recent events in Ceuta and Melilla and the situation in Lampedusa and Malta, as well as in some Greek Islands, are clear indications that urgent action is required” (European Commission, 2005, p. 2)

Shortly after, the **Communication on Priority Actions for responding to the Challenges of Migration: First follow-up to Hampton Court** was issued. It set out a range of immediate actions to determine the partnerships with sending and transit countries in Africa. Next to the sections on increasing the cooperation for border control issues, the document emphasised the importance of a “balanced” approach.

“Migration, if well managed, can be a positive force for development in both Africa and Europe [...] the EU will develop approaches on migration to optimise the benefits of migration for all partners in a spirit of partnership”. (European Commission, 2005, p. 5)

Drawing on the common interest of the sending and receiving countries to optimise the benefits of migration, the Commission reinforced with this Communication its approach to include issues concerning the migration-development nexus into the partnership agreements with third countries. Furthermore, it calls to view migration as a “global” phenomenon that needs to be addressed in an international dialogue, based on solidarity.

The third part, which specifies the elements for dialogue and cooperation with the sub-Saharan countries, focuses, among other things, on the MDN strategies discussed in the Communication on Migration and Development. Remittances, diaspora engagement, brain circulation and brain drain as well as (and especially since the events in Melilla) human rights became a common ground for dialogue and cooperation between sending and receiving countries, namely between Europe and Africa.

The **Global approach to migration: priority actions focussing on Africa and the Mediterranean**, based on the communication just outlined, was adopted by the European Council in the Conclusions of 16 December 2005.

“Action must be taken to reduce illegal migration flows and the loss of lives, ensure safe return of illegal migrants, strengthen durable solutions for refugees, and build capacity to better manage migration, including through maximising the benefits to all partners of legal migration, while fully respecting human rights and the individual's right to seek asylum”. (European Council, 2005, p.9)

With adopting the Global Approach to Migration (GAM), the European Council “underlines the need for a balanced, global and coherent approach” (European Council, 2005, p. 2) in order to respond to the complex issues concerning migration. The GAM covers three areas of action: First, combating illegal migration; second, promoting legal migration and third, optimising the interrelation between migration and development. Therefore, the GAM covers the entire external dimension of EU migration policy. Hence, it constitutes the combination of control elements, like readmission agreements and border control and new soft instruments promoting enhanced dialogue and exchange of migration related information with third countries.

A year later, this GAM was complemented with the Commission **Communication on the Global Approach to Migration one year on: Towards a comprehensive European migration policy** in 2006. The Communication states and evaluates the actions undertaken so far to implement the GAM. Concerning migration-development matters, the Communication highlights the importance of creating jobs in the origin countries to reduce the migration pressure, especially from Africa. That is why “Migrants should be supported in contributing to the development of their countries of origin” (European Commission, 2006, p.5).

“Promoting investments in labour intensive sectors in regions with high outward migration will be an important priority [...] Other areas of cooperation will include remittances, brain drain, diasporas, good governance and illegal migration and trafficking in human beings.” (European Commission, 2006, pp.5-6)

According to the Commission, the next steps to approach this plan are to concentrate on improving the data collection and promoting the link between policy and research concerning migration-development issues. It becomes clear again that statistical data,

evidence and experience concerning migration-development related issues remains limited and that policy approaches are in a very early phase of their development. Therefore, the Communication emphasises the importance of closer cooperation through partnerships and enhanced dialogue with sending and transit countries in order to share experiences on remittances, circular migration, brain drain and root causes. Furthermore, migration profiles<sup>3</sup> can be created for every interested country, as this information can assist “African countries to solve the root causes of migration flows” (European Commission 2006, p.6). It is notable that the term “root causes” is progressively used in the context of “reducing the migration pressure” in this Communication. It makes clear that the goal of migration-development issues in partnership have the “European-centric” approach to manage, control and reduce migration flows through development, even if it might only fall under the EU’s “long-term objectives” (as declared in the Communication of 2002).

Apart from and border control issues, the Commission points out that the GAM’ s third area of action is not yet developed to a satisfactory extent. “For a truly comprehensive European migration policy, legal migration needs to be integrated into both the external and internal EU policies” (European Commission, 2006, p.6).

With the Communication *on Circular Migration and Mobility Partnerships between the European Union and third countries* in 2007, the Commission went one step further towards a framework for legal migration in the external dimensions of EU policy. It draws upon the instruments outlined in the GAM to manage legal movements of persons between the EU and third countries. The Communication introduces two possible frameworks, the so-called Mobility Partnerships with third countries and a possible scheme for circular migration.

These Mobility Partnerships can be negotiated “by the third countries that have committed themselves to cooperating actively with the EU on management of migration flows, including by fighting against illegal migration and that are interested in securing better access to EU territory for their citizens” (European Commission, 2007, p. 3). Therefore, these mobility partnerships are individually designed according to the “commitments expected from third countries” and the “commitments to be given by the EC and the Members States participating” (European Commission, 2007, p. 5). Although the

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<sup>3</sup> “Migration profiles are a policy tool that serve to garner and analyse relevant information necessary to develop concrete measures to a given situation in the field of migration and development” (European Commission, 2006, p.6).

Communication only constitutes an “example” of what such a partnership can look like, it is notable that the expected commitments only list a range of control and security measures to combat illegal migration, enhance border control and assure readmission. Yet, the commitments of the EC and Member States to this partnership can include, amongst other things, possible measures to fight brain drain, promote circular or return migration and facilitating short stay visa procedures, as explicitly mentioned in the Communication. Furthermore, the third country could expect efforts to facilitate the transfer of remittances or to provide information on labour opportunities. Therefore, the migration-development related issues have become part of the negotiation between EU and third countries’ cooperation on migration. Whereas the third countries should commit themselves to migration control measures, the EU, in turn, gives its commitment to optimise links between migration and development. In the Communication, it becomes clear that it is easier for the EU to spell out the third countries’ obligations concerning migration control than to commit itself to strategies that could have a positive impact on the development of the origin county.

The aspects of the migration-development nexus also play a role in the second part of the Communication, which outlines a range of issues “that need to be considered by the EU and its Member States in order to explore the most beneficial ways to facilitate circular migration” (European Commission, 2007, p. 8). It is pointed out that circular migration is a way of promoting brain circulation, skill and knowledge transfer and reducing brain drain:

“[...] circular migration will help EU Member States address their labour needs while exploiting potential positive impacts of migration on development and responding to the needs of countries of origin in terms of skill transfers and of mitigating the impact of brain drain”. (European Commission, 2007, p. 2)

However, the main objective of such measures, including the mobility partnership, seems to be more of a “credible alternative to illegal immigration” (European Commission, 2007, p.8). Another objective appears to be filling the labour market needs of the Member States: “Mechanisms to facilitate economic migration should be based on the labour needs of interested Member States, as assessed by them, while fully respecting the principle of Community preference for EU citizens” (European Commission, 2007, p. 5).

**The Stockholm Programme**, the third 5-years action plan for migration and asylum policy, draws considerably more attention to the linkage between migration and development than to the previous ones. It approves the GAM with its three areas of action as important strategic framework for the external dimensions of EU migration policy:

“Based on the original principles of solidarity, balance and true partnership with countries of origin and of transit outside the Union and in line with what already has been accomplished, the European Council calls for the further development and consolidation of this integrated approach.” (European Council, 2010, p. 28)

It emphasises the priority to make more use of the strategic and evidence-based instruments of the GAM such as the Mobility partnerships. “Partnerships should be flexible and responsive to the needs of both the Union and the partner countries, and should include cooperation on all areas of the Global Approach to Migration” (European Council, 2010, p. 28). This shows that the EU has recognised that such partnerships should not only benefit the EU, but the third countries involved as well. This might be a hint to former Communications such as the one previously outlined, which incorporated a quiet EU-centric view emphasising the migration control perspective.

Furthermore, the European Council calls the Commission to create proposals on three linkages between migration and development: First, making remittances safer, cheaper and easier; second, enhancing the development effect of diaspora groups and third, exploring temporary and circular migration schemes. This seems to introduce an important change from the former focus on Communications on the migration-development relation towards legally binding legislation.

More external factors that influenced the further development of the migration-development nexus in the external dimensions of EU migration policy are outlined in the **Communication on the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility** in 2011:

“Globalisation, demographic change and societal transformation are affecting the European Union, its Member States and countries around the world. According to United Nations assessments, there are 214 million international migrants worldwide and another 740 million internal migrants. There are 44 million forcibly displaced people. An estimated 50 million people are **living and working abroad** with irregular status. Migration is now firmly at the top of the European Union’s political agenda. The Arab spring and events in the Southern Mediterranean in 2011 further highlighted the need for a **coherent and comprehensive migration policy** for the EU.” (European Commission, 2011, p. 2)

Growing migration, the riots in the African countries and worries about expected migration flows from these countries have therefore provoked the felt need of the EU to reinforce the external dimensions of migration policy. The renewed Global Approach to Migration **and Mobility** (GAMM), as the new overarching framework of the EU External Migration

Policy, is the response and adaption to the “challenges of changing migration trends” (European Commission, 2011, p. 3).

It introduces several new aspects on the agenda and structures the quiet complex external migration policy in a more comprehensive way. It establishes a four pillar structure of the operational priorities with all of them being equally important: the first pillar treats legal migration and mobility issues, the second incorporates measures to prevent and reduce irregular migration and human trafficking and the third pillar promotes International protection and asylum policy. Finally, the fourth pillar includes all activities to “maximise the developmental impact of migration and mobility” and to counteract brain drain. This is obviously a big step towards integrating migration-development related issue on the policy agenda, since it is now regarded as just as important as the reduction of irregular migration.

Furthermore, the Communication introduces a very different perspective to the entire external dimensions of migration policy, namely the migrant-centred approach:

“In essence, migration governance is not about ‘flows’, ‘stocks’ and ‘routes’, it is about people. In order to be relevant, effective and sustainable, policies must be designed to respond to the aspirations and problems of the people concerned. Migrants should, therefore, be empowered by gaining access to all the information they need about their opportunities, rights and obligations.” (European Commission, 2011, p. 6)

With this approach, the Commission acknowledges the importance to view migration not only through the economy and security lens, but as well from a more human and rights-based perspective. This is also notable in the section dedicated to migration-development issues. It is pointed out that migrants are often subject to exploitation, abuse or deception. This is also often the case in “south-south” migration, which counts a considerably higher number of migrants than “south-north” migration. In this intra-regional context, the EU also commits itself to improve migration procedures, working conditions and money transfer systems.

Meanwhile, the conceptualisation of the linkage between migration and development did not change a lot. One can only notice that the Commission bases its arguments more on evidence than in former Communication, which is also notable in the staff working paper on Migration and Developing, accompanying this Communication. As a consequence of this greater knowledge and experience of the linkage between migration and development, the concerning statements, measures and goals are named more precisely

than before. For example brain drain is should be addressed through several channels such as the EU Blue Card (A), circular migration of health personnel and the “WHO Code of practice on the international recruitment of health personnel” (European Commission, 2011, p. 19). Furthermore, the terms “brain gain” and “brain waste” (A) are used the first time whereby the concepts and potential benefits and measures are still under investigation.

Remittances and the target to make transfer systems more transparent, less costly and secure remains a major concern and some achievements have been made in this field already. However, more attention is drawn to diasporas, the way the EU can benefit from their knowledge and how to engage them in development initiatives. Next to lounging of an diaspora database and platform, the EU “will continue to invest in leveraging its contribution to development and will seek to harness its partners’ knowledge and expertise better, notably for supporting entrepreneurs and SMEs” (European Commission, 2011, p. 23).

Although, this Communication is more precise and policy oriented than its predecessor, it is clear that the complexity of the migration-development nexus is still not investigated in many ways. Experience and data in order to address certain issues properly and effectively is still missing: “The recent consultations held by the Commission confirm that the reality and challenges faced by partner countries regarding the link between development and migration are much broader and more complex than the policy area addressed so far”.

To summarise the acquired insights of the past chapter shortly, the paradigm of the migration-development nexus within EU External Migration Policy has developed significantly during the past two decades. The externalisation of migration control measures, achieved through cooperation with origin and transit countries, emerged during the 1990s in order to compensate the loss of boarder control brought by the Schengen Agreements. Within this policy area the so-called “root causes” approach developed as a human-rights-based alternative to the security-centred approach. This new “preventive” approach, which intends to reduce the migration pressure by tackling the root causes of migration, such as poverty, constitutes the first linkage between migration and development in EU policy. However, the approach kept long time ignored and was then finally brought back on the agenda, when the Amsterdam Treaty caused some institutional change granting the Commission more competencies in this policy area.

From 2002 on, the linkage was more and more considered in the partnership policy with third countries as also its paradigm had changed. The following catch phrases keep it to the point: the understanding and instrumentalisation of the MDN shifted from a “more development for less migration” to a “better migration for more development” approach. First, the aspects of remittances, brain circulation and brain drain were identified as important elements of the linkage and have been complemented later by issues on diaspora engagement. Yet, these developments did not take place within a political vacuum: the events in Ceuta and Melilla in 2005, as well as the international pressure of organisations like the United Nations, have pushed the EU to consider the developmental impact of migration to a greater extend. Additionally, the Arab Spring in 2011 and the expected migration flows from the African countries further reinforced the EU’s Global Approach to Migration. Today, the migration-development nexus builds an integral part of the EU External Migration Policy and finds itself on equal footing with irregular migration issues. Yet, that the complexity of the nexus and the missing experience still challenges policy makers to grasp and address its aspect in an effective manner.

## **Conclusion**

The “boom” of the interest in the migration-development nexus and the sheer “euphoria” about the potential positive impact of migration on development in the beginning of the new millennium, has also entered EU politics. Considering that a reversal of the MDN paradigm from scepticism to euphoric optimism took place, this dissertation aimed to answer the question why and how the MDN paradigm has changed so suddenly. In order to have a comprehensive understanding of the migration-development nexus the dissertation illuminated its paradigm from three different angles: firstly, the theoretical perspectives and policy measures concerning the positioning of migration in development cooperation were assessed. Secondly, it was examined how and why the MDN entered the centre stage of the international attention, identifying as well the main argumentation lines within the debate. Thirdly, the emergence and development of the MDN within EU External Migration Policy was investigated by applying a discourse analysis of EU documents.

One major factor, which pushed the MDN into the public attention, was the excitement about the magnitude of remittances that are sent to origin countries. Therefore, remittances are often regarded as a less bureaucratic “bottom up” approach in order to reduce poverty and encourage investments in origin countries. However, the findings of the second chapter suggest that this “euphoria” has to be seen with caution, as there are also some critical aspects of the effects of remittances on development. One striking point is for example that remittances would increase inequalities between remittance-receiving and other communities. Furthermore, migration is a selective process, which means that the poorest people, who are in most need of financial assistance, do not have the privilege to migrate. In general, the debate about the positive and negative effects of migration on development seems to be “unsettled” as evidence remains weak.

The development of the MDN paradigm in EU policy reflects the happenings and argumentation lines in international debate about the nexus to a great extent. The first notion of the MDN has emerged in EU policy already in the 1990s as the so-called “root causes” approach, in order to reduce migration flows from developing countries. However, the approach kept long time ignored and was then finally brought back on the agenda, when the Amsterdam Treaty caused some institutional change granting the Commission more competencies in this policy area. The 2002 Communication, made clear that a paradigm change from a “more development for less migration” to a “better migration for more development” approach was taking place at that time. Like as well in the international debate, the greatest attention was drawn on remittances. But in 2005, in the

preparation for the UN High Level Dialogue on Migration and Development, the European approach to the nexus entered a new stage. The events of Ceuta and Melilla pushed the EU to reconsider its security-centred approach and to take action towards a more “balanced” and “comprehensive” perspective to migration within its partnerships with third countries.

The Council’s adaption of the Global Approach to Migration indicated the EU’s willingness to incorporate the different aspects of the linkage between migration and development, in order to maximise the benefits for receiving and sending countries. Although the greatest attention was drawn to remittances up to now, as it is the most tangible and measurable of the developmental impacts, the other elements of the migration-development nexus are nowadays considered to be of equal importance. The “brain drain” debate has turned into a “brain gain” debate as the significance of social remittances was acknowledged. Therefore, the EU explores measures in order to promote “brain circulation” through circular migration schemes. The improvement of communication and transportation technology gave path to a new dimension of the nexus, namely the role that “diaspora” and “transnational communities” can play in the developmental processes of their home countries.

However, the discourse analysis has revealed that the policy measures undertaken in the area of migration-development related issues remain EU-centric in their approach. In the Communication on Circular Migration and Mobility Partnerships it was obvious, that it is easier for the EU to spell out the third countries’ obligations concerning migration control than to commit itself to strategies that could have a positive impact on the development of the origin country. However, the events of the Arab Spring in 2011 have pushed the further integration of migration/development issues into EU policy. Consequently, the Stockholm treaty emphasised that partnerships should be based on solidarity and balance of interest. This was already incorporated in the overall framework of the EU External Migration Policy, namely the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility. Today, the linkage between migration and development constitute one of the four equally important pillars of the external dimensions. These developments give hope that partnerships become less asymmetrical and bring more benefits to origin countries.

Looking at the history of the nexus - with its shift from optimism to pessimism and back to optimism again – and the fact that research always supported the arguments of the dominant paradigm, it becomes clear that social science also supported the dominant view of migration issues in European politics. Castles’ (2008) question if the

contemporary optimism about the nexus „really reflect[s] a scientific revolution, or [if] it is just that policy makers have given the nod to this approach because it fits current political needs?“ (p.10) cannot be answered satisfactorily as the evidence about the migration/development relationship remains weak and contradictory. It goes without saying that we would like to regard the former as true. However, as we have seen both, pessimistic and optimistic approaches and their argumentation it is clear that the linkage between migration is not positive nor negative, but it is both. Therefore, after shifting from one extreme to the other, back and forth, it becomes time that migration and development is seen from a more nuanced and balanced perspective in the international community.

I would like to conclude this paper with the words of Kethleen Newland, as they strikingly summarize the most important insights that have been acquired in this dissertation in an illustrative way:

“The intersection of international migration and development is not a simple crossroads. It more strongly resembles a complex modern freeway intersection, with multiple levels, on- and off-ramps, and many opportunities to take the wrong direction. But the intersection also offers an efficient way to move toward a destination, and increasing numbers of governments and institutions are determined to ride international migration toward a future of greater prosperity. Unfortunately, at this point they have no roadmap.”  
(Newland, 2007, para. 1)

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## **Annex 1: Definitions**

The following definitions were mainly acquired from the European Commission's online glossary (European Commission, Directorate General of Home Affairs - Glossary), if not indicated differently.

**Brain drain:** "The loss suffered by a country as a result of the emigration of (highly) qualified persons"

**Brain gain:** "An increase in the number of highly trained, foreign-born professionals entering a country to live and work where greater opportunities are offered".

**Brain waste:** "The non-recognition of the skills and qualifications acquired by migrants outside of the EU, which prevents them from fully using their potential".

**Circular Migration:** "A form of migration that is managed in a way allowing some degree of legal mobility back and forth between two countries".

**Diaspora:** "Individuals and members or networks, associations and communities, who have left their country of origin, but maintain links with their homelands". "The diaspora from a given country therefore includes not only the nationals from that country living abroad, but also migrants who, living abroad, have acquired the citizenship of their country of residence (often losing their original citizenship in the process) and migrants' children born abroad, whatever their citizenship, as long as they retain some form of commitment to and/or interest in their country of origin or that of their parents. In some extreme cases, such as the Chinese diaspora, people may still feel part of a country's diaspora even though their family has been living in another country for several generations" (European Commission, 2005a)

**EU Blue Card:** "Gives highly-qualified non-EU workers the right to live and work in an EU State, provided that they have higher professional qualifications, such as a university degree, and an employment contract or a binding job offer with a high salary compared to the average in the EU State where the job is. The EU Blue Card applies in 24 of the 27 EU States. It does not apply in Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom".

**External Dimension of EU Migration** - EU policy area incorporating channels for dialogue and cooperation with the main origin states in order to control migration movements into the European Union better (own definition).

**Financial remittances:** “All financial transfers from migrants to beneficiaries in their countries of origin.”

**Forced migration:** “A general term that refers to the movements of refugees and internally displaced people (those displaced by conflicts) as well as people displaced by natural or environmental disasters, chemical or nuclear disasters, famine, or development project”

**Irregular migration:** “The movement of a person to a new place of residence or transit using irregular or illegal means, without valid documents or carrying false documents”

**Labour migration:** “Migration mainly for economic reasons or in order to seek material improvements”

**Readmission Agreements:** “International agreement that addresses procedures, on a reciprocal basis, for one State to return non-nationals in an irregular situation to their home State or a State through which they have transited.”

**Remittances:** “All financial transfers from migrants to beneficiaries in their countries of origin”

**Social remittances:** “ideas, practices, identities and social capital that flow back to families and communities at origin” (UNDP, 2009, p. 79).