

CIMIC since 1945.

Historical, Political, and Operational Contexts

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1. Introduction

Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) is a NATO concept used during peace support operations that has gained some popularity over the last couple of years. Governments, international organizations, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), and armed forces cooperate during peace support operations to create new stable societies or offer relief during crisis situations. As United States Admiral Leighton W. Smith, Jr., commander of NATO forces in Southern Europe during the operations Restore Hope in Northern Iraq and IFOR in Bosnia, said in April 1996, 'In November we had never heard of CIMIC. We had no idea what you did. Now we can't live without you.'¹

Not only did Leighton express how important CIMIC was to him as commander, he also indicated that CIMIC was a relatively unknown concept until recently. There were several reasons why CIMIC was unknown. One explanation could be that Leighton was U.S. Navy, while CIMIC is basically an Army concept. Leighton was also American, while CIMIC is more a European NATO term.² Moreover, during the Cold War period CIMIC used to have a different meaning, closer to the idea of Host Nation Support. NATO's Cold War CIMIC was geared toward the possible great conflict in Europe between East and West. In those circumstances civilian authorities would support the military mission. The key factor of CIMIC during the Cold War was the support by civilian authorities to military commanders. Harbour facilities, railways, and roads would be earmarked for military use, making an easy transfer of military means to the operational area possible. Food and fuel would be handed to the military units as part of a continuing logistic support (Janssens & Visser, 2000: 102).

In the period since the Cold War the concept of CIMIC has taken on an almost opposite meaning. CIMIC is now a military activity that forms a part of a peace support operation, which might include giving support to a local or national government. Some of the contemporary CIMIC activities of a military unit could be the building of roads, bridges, schools, and hospitals, or giving supplies to civilian authorities. This reversal in meaning of CIMIC - from civilians supporting a military operation to a military operation in order to aid civilians - is the natural result of the new type of military operations since the end of the Cold War.

It would be incorrect, however, to see CIMIC as only a contemporary form of military activity. CIMIC takes place during military operations in which military forces cooperate closely with local government to establish a more peaceful society. In this article we will show how this type of military operation has developed over the last fifty years, and what challenges and opportunities CIMIC offers in its old and new form.

2. Civil-Military Cooperation in its various forms

CIMIC, in its present meaning, forms a part of peace support operations. The NATO definition of CIMIC is, 'The coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil populations, including national and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organizations and agencies.'³ The idea of co-

operation between military and civilian authorities in this kind of operation is not new. It can also be found in such concepts as 'Civil Affairs,' 'Nation Building' or 'Heart and Minds Campaigns.' 'Nation Building' and the specific American notion of 'Civil Affairs' assume a predominance of the military forces in a peace enforcing operation, which can involve changing the political structure of the occupied nation. 'Hearts and Minds' campaigns are established to win the support of the local population for a military operation and, ultimately, for the government that initiated the campaign. Characteristic of CIMIC, though, is the lack of political involvement. Military personnel are used to help out in rebuilding the economy or institutions such as hospitals or schools. Changing the local political structure or power balance in the operational area is not part of the design.

The absence of an (outspoken) political dimension is understandable in the context of a peace support operation. The original idea is that peace support operations take place in an area where all parties involved want a peaceful solution to their conflict. If peaceful cooperation is the premise, then efforts at changing the political arena are detrimental to the operation.

In reality, though, not all peace support operations are that clear-cut. Sometimes peace support operations lose the support of one or more parties involved, as in Cambodia, or the operation turns violent, as in Somalia. Some operations, as in Haiti, where a democratic government was re-installed, are political from the beginning to the end.

As in all Western military operations, politicians determine what kind of operation will be executed. Governments whose armed forces have a CIMIC capacity, have already decided that there will only be a limited political aspect to their peace support operations. In general, their military commanders agree with them. They train their troops for conventional warfare. Peace support operations, where their soldiers execute very different tasks, are of limited interest.⁴ Paradoxically, political involvement might result in their being caught up in a shooting war, which they do not want either, since they will not be up to full combat preparedness during a peace support operation. The American experience in Somalia is the dreaded case in point.

Another assumption concerning CIMIC is that all kinds of NGOs are actively involved. The idea is even that NGOs will most likely be in the operational area before the peace support operation begins, and will remain there after the military activities have ended. In other words, NGOs have a better knowledge of the local circumstances and they can offer important information to the peace support troops, which makes the idea of Civil Military Cooperation even more important. At a local level this regularly works out, too. Both military commanders at unit level and local NGO workers see the obvious needs of the population and try to solve them as well as circumstances allow.

On top of that, there are also expectations at a strategic level. NGOs are expected to take over whenever the military commanders or their political leaders decide to pull out the military forces after they have achieved the goal of establishing peace and order. The assumption is that NGOs, and maybe also the governments of the intervening nations, have an overall plan and an end state for the peace support operation in mind. This is often not the case, which makes cooperation between military forces and NGOs at a strategic level often hard to achieve.

Cooperation between military forces and NGOs can also be difficult because of the complicated relationship of NGOs with national governments. Most NGOs have come into being as a result of their conviction that national governments could not or did not want to address certain (international) problems. 'Médecins sans Frontières', for instance, was established because physicians believed not enough was done to help people in the conflict in Bangladesh. Often, it is crucial for NGOs not to be affiliated with any national government either, to make sure that the parties involved in the conflict see them as independent, which can make Civil-Military Cooperation hard.⁵

3. World War II and its Aftermath

During the Second World War the Americans and British practised a form of what we now call CIMIC in areas liberated from the enemy as well as in enemy territory. In both cases, the military command had to look for local politicians to work with. In general, this was easier in liberated countries, where it was often clear who had opposed the wartime regime. The choice was not always clear-cut, though. The United States had a hard time picking the ‘right’ French ally. In South Korea the American choice of Syngman Rhee as the political leader was less than fortunate, since his ultra-conservative ideas did not support the development of a sound democratic regime. While occupying enemy territory, it was often even harder to find trustworthy politicians (i.e. politicians who would cooperate with the Western powers). Civilian authorities still functioning here were deemed unacceptable. Moreover, purging these elements would take considerable time. It was therefore inevitable that the military had the scene to themselves—at least as long as it took to find suitable civilians to assist them in running the occupied areas and within the confines of the goals set by their politicians. The ‘local’ political leaders they needed had to come from abroad (where they had gone into exile before the war), from prison, concentration camps or retirement. Some of the exiles, though, had attached themselves to the American or British military (as well as to the Russians). Most of them wore allied uniforms, but were able to function as interim partners in CIMIC. All in all, the concept of CIMIC did not, strictly speaking, apply to occupied enemy territory during and directly after the World War. The victorious allies had no other option than to instill a form of military government here.

Only gradually did true civil-military cooperation emerge. Besides, the military government was of a very special kind. Apart from governing a ravaged country, the occupying military had two other functions to perform. First, to bring to justice war criminals and persons held to be responsible for the outbreak of the war and imposing a criminal régime on their society. Second, to reform the political, economic, educational and social spheres of the defeated countries. In this they mostly had to find their own way. Although, in the American example, the planning of occupied territories had taken place in cooperation with the State Department during the war, the War Department had pushed the State Department to the sidelines with regard to the execution of *Civil Affairs*. Originally, President Roosevelt had intended to let the State Department coordinate the work of all kinds of United States government agencies during Civil Affairs, including that of the War Department. After the first World War II experiences with Civil Affairs in North Africa, Roosevelt decided that the War Department should lead the planning and the initial stages of military government in liberated and occupied territories. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General George C. Marshall, recalled the reason for this change in policy: ‘[commander of the operation, General Dwight D.] Eisenhower’s disgust with these seventeen civilian agencies roaming around areas in Africa, causing him more trouble than the Germans ...’ (Janssens, 1995: 149). The British followed the American example, even though they only began to plan at the end of the war, partly because their people and means were tightly stretched. With the war over and eager to concentrate once more on their *core business*, the armed forces found themselves forced to continue this work. It would take time and the rehabilitation of the erstwhile enemies (due to the outbreak of the Cold War) to bring this situation to an end.

These radical developments did not occur in the liberated countries in Western Europe. Here the advancing British and American armies did not find a political and societal vacuum that they had to fill by themselves. In these territories, politically and socially acceptable civilians were present, willing and able to enter into cooperative relations with the allied military. These civilians, however, were not yet acting as autonomous partners. While the war lasted, they functioned under a special régime that gave extended powers to their own military. So, in

a way, even here the concept of civil-military cooperation was not applicable in its pure form. Local civilians - from the private sector and government services - did not always come into direct contact with representatives of the foreign military. These contacts were regulated, coordinated and supervised by military personnel of their own countries, acting under martial law (De Jong, 1980).

This delicate constellation functioned on the whole rather smoothly. To account for this happy situation, the following points should be taken into consideration. In the first place, during and (shortly) after the war, the military enjoyed an unprecedented prestige in Western Europe - even in the Netherlands, an otherwise markedly unheroic nation. This high esteem could not but help the military in imposing the restrictive measures that were deemed necessary in the period following the departure of the German forces. The military were very much *in the picture*. To be in contact with them, to work with them, to be in a position to be helpful to them, even to be seen with them, lent some prestige to those civilians cooperating with them. Second, the liberators were helped by the fact that the Germans had, in Western Europe at least, not completely destroyed the pre-war governmental and societal structures. Much was damaged, but enough had survived the harsh regime to help the allied military. Consequently, they were able to delegate a considerable part of their responsibilities. With so many experts at hand from the local economic, financial, medical, educational, and other spheres, there was no need to keep all cards in their own hands. Even the removal of collaborators and the bringing to justice of war criminals could be delegated to local authorities (the problems to which this policy led in France, with its complicated Vichy-past, cannot be dealt with here).⁶

In the liberated areas CIMIC was, as long as the war lasted, directed at two main fields of action. First, a major concern were humanitarian problems, such as the supply and distribution of food. Second, and more important to the military commanders, the emphasis lay on the preparation of these countries for their role as operating bases from which assaults on Germany could be launched. To fulfil this second function, elaborate logistical preparations were called for. Harbour entrances had to be cleared, infra-structural repairs to be made, a skilled labour force to be assembled and set to work, etc. Many humanitarian relief measures, moreover, were clearly helpful in the context of the military preparations. As a matter of fact, it is sometimes difficult to separate the two fields of action. Taking care, for instance, of refugees wandering through the countryside fits in both categories. Apart from their humanitarian dimension, these measures were deemed necessary in order to clear the roads for military purposes, to bring some order in the administrative chaos, to prevent the outbreak of epidemics among an undernourished population, and to stimulate the revival of economic life. So, humanitarian and military considerations were supplementary in the final phase of the war.

Eventually - after the war - a political motive came into play that was to grow in importance once the Soviet threat cast its shadow over Western Europe. Economic and social recovery was seen as a means to prevent Western Europe from falling prey to social unrest on which radical (leftist) parties could flourish. At the time these worries seemed hardly ill-founded. Communist parties, for one thing, were rather strong (partly due to the prestige their members had earned as resistance fighters). Moreover, there were still memories of how the *Great Depression* of the 1930s had led to all kinds of radical political movements, from both the left and the right. Under these circumstances a speedy economic recovery to prevent a repetition of this process was an attractive goal for both the military and the civilian side of government. The other side of this coin, however, was that in order to help this recovery the military had to learn to trim their sails. In some Western European countries this consideration led to frictions (Brouwers, 1992). The military, after all, had to take account of what looked to them as a Soviet superiority in conventional arms. Still, the idea to give economic recovery priority as the best defense against the Soviet threat was instrumental in launching the Marshall-plan.

The Americans - including the military - expected the Western Europeans to defend themselves. To attain this goal, a healthy economy and a stable society would be helpful. Military and civilian authorities did not only deliberate on the amount of money to be spent on the economy and rearmament. Several other issues can be mentioned. Among them one will be singled out here, because it formed a direct link between the experiences of the war and the possibility of a Soviet attack. In the 1930s large-scale inundations were prepared in the Netherlands in order to stop a German advance before it reached the heart of the country. After the German attack on Poland, these inundations were put into effect, a military measure that forced the government to evacuate thousands of people to other areas in the Netherlands. This measure, calling for close cooperation between the military and civilian authorities, caused many private inconveniences, but was concluded rather smoothly. What had not been foreseen, however, and for which consequently no preparations had been made, was the evacuation in May 1940 of the Royal family, the Cabinet, the national gold reserve, top civil servants, parts of the armed forces, etc. In order not to be caught unprepared a second time, elaborate measures were planned as soon as the Soviet threat became apparent. This time, Great Britain was not selected as the destination. First, because this country was thought to lie within the grasp of the Soviet forces. Second, because a government-in-exile should (ideally at least) not operate from foreign soil. As an alternative the West Indian islands were chosen—Dutch territory and conveniently close to the United States. Initially, the evacuation was planned on a truly grand scale. Tens of thousands of people were placed on priority lists—from the members of the Royal family to captains of industry. At the same time it was thought necessary to prepare for the reception of (perhaps hundreds of thousands of) Germans, who were expected to flee westward in case of a Soviet attack. To these refugees many Dutchmen would no doubt be added. These people on the run would pose both a humanitarian and a military problem, as they would spread panic, claim scarce resources, and hamper military movements. Clearly these problems asked for more than simply a Dutch approach. Soon, however, these grave concerns ebbed away. The military frontier of the Western alliance was shifted eastward, from the river IJssel to the inner German border. It was hoped now to absorb a Soviet attack on German soil without triggering a mass exodus. Even more importantly, the idea of a full-scale conventional confrontation in Central Europe between NATO and the Warsaw Pact receded into the background. It was hoped to deter aggression with the aid of thermonuclear weapons. Against this background, it should cause no surprise that the evacuation plans were given less and less attention, while the preparations concerned an ever-smaller number of people (Teitler, 1992).

4. Decolonization, Insurgencies, and CIMIC

The first wave of nationalism that swept over the Western colonies hit South-east Asia. The ease with which the Japanese had taken over the British-, French- and Dutch-controlled territories had much to do with the strength of these revolutions. Another reason of course, was that the colonial masters simply intended to return to their possessions and put the clock four years back. Having promised independence to the Philippine people, the United States was spared the turmoil of a nationalist revolution (though the successor state had to contend with communist and Muslim-separatist uprisings). The return to colonial rule was, incidentally, a rather disorderly affair. The allies had reckoned with a long struggle to the death of Japan and its sudden surrender in August 1945 caught them by surprise (Teitler, 1990). As a matter of fact, the over-extended British, but also the Dutch and the French, were not yet ready at that time to take over their colonies. Most civil servants still had to return from prison camps and were often too exhausted after their experiences there to directly take up their pre-war responsibilities (De Jong, 1986). Others, however, had been recruited and trained during the

war in areas that had escaped occupation. For them *Civil Affairs* sections had been formed as part of the allied armed forces. Still, their numbers were inadequate to cover all that was suddenly asked of the civil service. To make matters worse, the colonial societies with their business firms, plantations, clubs, associations, schools, churches, and hospitals had been completely destroyed by the Japanese. So, the situation found by the allied military in South-east Asia was utterly different from the one they had encountered in Western Europe.⁷ Compared with the latter area, the British, French and Dutch colonies were clearly in need of a much stronger input, for a longer period of time, by the military in the reconstruction of the economy and society.

This situation was intensified by the fact that these colonies were almost at once confronted by nationalist and/or communist revolutions. The insurgents availed themselves of several political and military tactics to reach their goals. Guerrilla warfare was among them, but did not play an equally prominent role everywhere. It is worth noting that in the French and British colonies - Indo-China and Malaya -, where the revolutionaries were dominated by communists, guerrilla warfare was more important than in Indonesia. Here the insurgents were mainly nationalists (with a rather strong leaning towards Islam), who sometimes ruthlessly dealt with their communist rivals. It is too easy to attribute this difference to the communists drawing their inspiration from the example and writings of Mao Zedong. Such an explanation ignores the many political, cultural and economic differences between the colonies in question. Be that as it may, the Dutch were the first to feel compelled to grant their opponents independence. Their national resources were smaller than those of their French and British colonial colleagues. Besides, their opponents - not being tainted by communism - were as future rulers of Indonesia acceptable to the Americans (McMahon, 1981). After all, the United States had not hesitated to hand the Philippines over to what it saw as a comparable political movement. The Dutch were unable to withstand this pressure, to which many other countries beside the United States lent weight. By 1949 Dutch colonial rule was over. This outcome at least spared them the exhausting years the French had still to go through in Indo-China before they too were forced to leave South-east Asia. Even the British in Malaya did not escape this outcome in the end. Still, of the three Western European colonial powers only the British left of their own free will. So, in the end, all three colonial powers had to grant their colonies independence. It was the road they went that differed, and it was this difference that mattered in the context of civil-military cooperation.

The importance of CIMIC for counter-insurgency can hardly be overrated. This proposition, moreover, retains relevancy beyond of the de-colonization process. The Cold War brought many other instances of counter-insurgency and in each of these CIMIC (or its absence) played a key-role in determining the outcome of the struggle. This cooperation is what has been called the *hearts and minds campaign*, since the British counter-insurgency in Malaya (Stubbs, 1989). The idea behind this campaign is simple. It is the reverse of Mao Zedong's famous dictum that guerrilla fighters need the help of people in their theatre of operation - for food, shelter, sometimes for weapons, always for intelligence. So, counter-insurgency should aim to sever this link. This can be done in two complementary ways. The first belongs to the strictly military domain. By constant and aggressive patrolling with very small units, the enemy is forced to be constantly on the move. To accomplish this feat these units will have to surpass, or at least equal, the guerrilla fighters' ability to live, move and fight in inhospitable regions. In this way the insurgents become the hunted party, a condition that prevents them from contacting the local population. Without intelligence, food and shelter, their situation is one of increasing vulnerability. Eventually, there is for them no way out of this predicament. They can, of course, try to escape from their pursuers by retreating into ever more peripheral wastes. There, however, they are cut off from support and cannot hope to attract new recruits. The insurgents are doomed here to ineffectiveness and will eventually simply wither on the

vine. The second way to deal with guerrilla fighters is to convince the local population that their future is not well served by the insurgents. When this message comes across the insurgents will receive less and less help and they will be forced to take what the locals used to give them of their own free will. Inevitably, the local population will resent this robbery and will be even less inclined to exert themselves to help the insurgents. In the end, the result is the same as with the military counter-insurgency: the enemy is cut off from his supporting base, a condition in which he cannot survive for long.

So, in any insurgency the Achilles heel of the revolutionary movement is its relationship with the local population. All efforts by the government forces should be directed at separating these two entities. To this end, they will have to wield both the stick and the carrot, and while civilian authorities cannot contribute much to the use of the (military) stick, the military can be of help when it comes to using the carrot. A hearts and minds campaign is essentially an attempt at winning over the local population. To be sure, not all of the government measures taken to this end will be popular at first. It can be deemed necessary, for instance, to resettle the rural population. First, in order to offer them better protection; second, to control their food supply and supervise the way they are dealing with their surpluses. Such a resettlement programme can cause a lot of trouble to the peasants, and it will take time, ample resources and convincing arguments to smooth the way. What is also needed is close cooperation between the military and civilian agencies involved in this project. A hearts and minds campaign can only succeed when the insurgents can be kept at a distance and are not allowed to disturb the process by using violence against local dignitaries.

So, protection by the military is called for, at least until the time when the villagers can be trusted enough to be given arms in order to look after their own security. It is imperative to reach this point in time as quickly as possible. After all, binding the military to the stationary defense of villages and rural towns is a waste of scarce resources. Once they can leave the protection of these objects to the local inhabitants, they are free to enter guerrilla territory and try to make it unsafe for the insurgents. The hearts and minds campaign itself should be a mixture of a social and political programme (aimed at redressing grievances) and simple community work. In the latter category fit the introduction of medical services, housing projects, educational and other public facilities, including infra-structural works (such as roads, bridges and dams). Especially important, moreover, are projects aimed at the regulation of food supplies and the improvement of police services. The first project serves a dual purpose. First, it should end social inequalities (in this way giving the lie to guerrilla propaganda). Second, it should deprive the insurgents of an easy source of sustenance. The police, finally, should realize that they occupy a key position in counter-insurgency. They must try to become fair and incorruptible in their dealings with the local population. Only then will they be able to gain the trust of the locals and gather the intelligence on which the military depend for their successes.

A hearts and minds campaign should bring the military into close cooperation with civilian authorities, both public and private. To implement it wholeheartedly and flexibly has proven, however, to be a rather difficult task. Even the British, who take pride in having ended the Malaya insurgency in this way, have not always been equal to the task on later occasions as was shown in Kenya, Cyprus, and Northern Ireland (Mockaitis, 1990). Still, one feature of their Malaya campaign should be stressed here. It concerns the pre-eminent position the British assigned to the civilian side in CIMIC-relations. No doubt this arrangement reflected their administrative and political history. It should not come as a surprise then that other countries, France, for instance, or the United States, did not automatically follow this line in their hearts and minds campaigns. Nor, as a matter of fact, were they inclined to pay the same amount of attention to this campaign in their counter-insurgency doctrines as the British did. To be sure, after the classic success in Malaya it is difficult to completely ignore the impor-

tance of a 'hearts and minds' campaign. However, more often than not, this attention amounts in practice to little more than paying lip service. In this context, the French experiences with CIMIC in the Algerian war are especially instructive.

From the beginning, the French military dominated this relationship, a situation that contributed little to the successful conduct of counter-insurgency (Paret, 1964). In the end, moreover, some radical elements in the military establishment even adopted the view that they alone knew how to counter the threat of the communist (as they labeled all nationalist) insurgents. This view led to a belief in the necessity of a counter-ideology, without which the West could not hope to withstand the communist assault (or its lure). Furthermore, these radicals convinced themselves that the French society - in their eyes on the brink of moral degeneration - ought to be saved from itself. The military, in other words, had the sacred duty to act as guardians of a society that had lost its moral vigour. Inevitably, this kind of reasoning led to a *perverse kind of CIMIC*, in which the military aspired a political role. Another point to note is that in this way the military vented their frustration with a war they could not win, an outcome for which they held not themselves, but society and politics responsible. After all, in their view these entities had failed to give them their full support. After first neglecting *low level* CIMIC, the French military radicals in Algeria finally opted for a *high level* variant. They staged a coup and for a short time ruled Algeria by *military government*. Fortunately, this perversion of CIMIC has no general relevancy. It can only be understood against the background of two phenomena. First, the West was - according to the French radicals - not fighting the Cold War vigorously enough and, then, there was the peculiar French tradition of the military to see themselves as the saviours of a nation that was often indifferent to its own true interests.

The United States tried to use Civil Affairs in Vietnam. Various programmes were developed, all in line with the idea that by supporting and protecting the local population, the guerilla movement would find it harder to operate successfully. In general these programmes did not achieve their aims. There were two major reasons for their lack of success. First, the U.S. Army cooperated with the South Vietnamese armed forces in these programmes. The South Vietnamese military moved the programmes on too fast and were prone to corruption. Second, the U.S. Army decided to deploy their battalions at full force, including artillery support, even for Civil Affairs activities. At one point, to measure the success of their operations, the U.S. forces used a 'body count,' which sometimes led to indiscriminate killing of the South Vietnamese population in order to destroy the guerilla movement. Obviously, these kinds of actions did not increase the popularity of the U.S. armed forces or the South Vietnamese government with the South Vietnamese people. Consequently, this kind of CIMIC did not diminish the role of the Communist guerillas and was a failure (Krepinivich, 1986).

In the context of the history of CIMIC it is interesting to see that the Americans used a new approach. During World War II, Civil Affairs was run by the military only. In Vietnam, the U.S. Army and Marine Corps worked together with civilian American government organisations, such as the (American) Agency for International Development (AID).

5. CIMIC and the Post-Cold War Period

At the end of World War II and during the Cold War civil-military cooperation took place in preparation of, during, or after a war in which countries were directly involved. In the period after the Cold War, CIMIC took place during peace support operations, basically post-conflict operations. In these cases, the military were (initially at least) no party to the conflict and acted as a neutral. In as far as they resorted to violence they did so more in a police than in a strictly military capacity. They were therefore bound to the use of minimum force, guided in this by rather restrictive rules of engagement.

The end of the Cold War and the success of international cooperation in the liberation of Kuwait offered a positive outlook on conflicts around the world. UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali, in his 'Agenda for Peace,' used the cooperation in the Security Council to strive for more efforts at resolving these conflicts.⁸ Boutros Ghali's proposal spurred new types of peace support operations. Previously, peace support operations were mostly about guarding the border between two nations that had been at war, as in the Sinai between Israel and Egypt or in Kashmir between India and Pakistan. The second-generation peace support operations generally took place within nations, and were aimed at helping to set up new democratic regimes, as in Cambodia or in former Yugoslavia. CIMIC became an important part of these operations, both within and outside NATO operations.

In addition to Boutros Ghali's policy initiative, CIMIC in its present shape has two more origins. The first additional origin lies with the American armed forces. They practised their form of CIMIC, Civil Affairs, during the liberation of Kuwait, and later in Northern Iraq. After the failure of Operation Restore Hope in Somalia and the disturbing consequences of non-intervention in Rwanda, American Civil Affairs officers were again successful during Operation Restore Democracy in Haiti and IFOR and SFOR in Bosnia. When the United States government decided to diminish its contribution to SFOR, European NATO partners were also asked to participate in CIMIC activities (Heflebower, 1998).

Around this time NATO requested three European nations, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands, to establish their own CIMIC capacity. The Netherlands decided to cooperate with five other countries in the region, among others Germany, Denmark, and Poland, which has recently resulted in the CIMIC Group North. Italy and the United Kingdom are still working on their CIMIC forces. Although never officially stated, it seemed that NATO's request for European CIMIC forces was the result of an American initiative. While the European nations in NATO were preoccupied with their 'peace dividend' (i.e. scaling down their defense budgets at the end of the Cold War), the United States government became worried about the divergence between American and European NATO forces. It spent more money on defence and, consequently, it had more troops and more technically advanced equipment. From the American perspective, it seemed also that in general the United States was more willing to commit troops to military operations than most European governments; troops which were consequently more battle-hardened. As a result, the United States government apparently decided they would do the full-scale operations, and the Europeans could do the resulting peace keeping operations.

The second additional origin of contemporary CIMIC was the experience Europeans gathered in peace support operations during the 1990s. For example, while the Royal Netherlands Marine Corps was deployed in Cambodia, supporting the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), the then Dutch Minister of Development Cooperation visited the country. He was very impressed by the work of the Marines, and decided to give them 500,000 Dutch guilders (about 200,000 U.S. dollars) to develop local support projects, like building schools, hospitals, or roads (Ter Beek, 1996: 112). These funds – the so-called *Potje Pronk* (Pronk's Money Box), named after the Minister - were available to the Marines and Dutch Army during later peace support operations as well. The Royal Netherlands Marine Corps, for instance, used funds from 'Potje Pronk' during Operation Provide Comfort in Northern Iraq and during Operation Restore Democracy in Haiti. Spending this money wisely and as effectively as possible, the Royal Netherlands Marine Corps gathered even more experience in the CIMIC aspects of peacekeeping.

Originally, the post-Cold War United Nations peace support operations were founded on the voluntary cooperation of the parties involved in the conflict and the nations that contributed military personnel to the UN peace keeping force. This explains why the intervening military forces took a neutral stance. They were there only to restore and to keep order and peace. The

parties directly involved in the conflict were supposed to have agreed on a willingness to achieve peace. In this context CIMIC was helpful in establishing economic and social foundations for a new society, by giving aid to setting up new roads, bridges, schools, and hospitals. At the same time, local military commanders had to deal with local government, and cooperate when possible. While during previous periods CIMIC meant taking over some or all tasks of local government, in recent years it has all been about working together with local government.

It soon turned out that few operations would run according to this scheme. In Cambodia in 1993, one of the parties, the Red Khmer, decided not to participate in the agreement they had helped to set up, making future arrangements more difficult to attain. In Angola in 1992, in Rwanda in 1994, and recently in Sierra Leone, the parties that had signed a peace treaty did not adhere to it, and this resulted in a new conflict. Problems also arose when nations that participated in United Nations peace keeping operations showed less commitment than expected. Another issue was that risk assessments were not always accurate, which resulted in missions that proved to be more difficult than expected or prepared for.

UN Secretary General Kofi Annan had been Assistant Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations in 1992 and 1993, after which he became Under Secretary General in this job until he was elected Secretary General in 1997. To address the problems during these operations, Annan had reports written on the disasters during the United Nations operations in Rwanda and Srebrenica. Wanting to improve the United Nations record in peace operations, Annan had a panel under chairman Lakhdar Brahimi write a report with recommendations. In this so-called Brahimi report it was suggested, among other things, that the Secretary General and his staff be given a more central role in these operations. Simultaneously, member states of the United Nations were asked to show more commitment to peace operations.⁹

While the United Nations organization tried to get better at peace operations, nations have recently begun recently to act more through regional organizations, with the consent of the United Nations. The Organization of African States tried to deal with the civil war in Liberia; NATO occupied Kosovo and established a provisional government there.

As referred to above, NGOs were most of the time active in the regions where the peace support operations were to take place. Cooperation between the military and NGOs often went smoothly at a tactical level, especially when some of the local parties did not believe in a peaceful solution of the conflict. What was more problematic was that NGOs among themselves, and NGOs and the national governments who had sent peace support forces, did not talk or agree on the means and ultimate goals of the peace support operation. Military forces involved in the peace support operations often defined their success in terms of establishing and keeping order and peace, not so much in solving the conflict as such.

6. Conclusion

The concept of civil-military cooperation refers to an essentially one-sided relationship. It regards the ways in which military personnel aid civilian authorities to fulfil their duties. The converse relationship is not covered by the concept. In this case, civilians assist the military with activities ranging from logistical support to irregular warfare. This assistance is left out of the discussion here. CIMIC is a one-sided affair for at least two reasons. First, because the civilian side of the relationship is clearly in disarray. Second, because the military have at their disposal some of the expertise needed to rectify this situation. Moreover, it is necessary to stress that the civilians do not exclusively belong to the group of public servants at the various levels of government. Representatives of private organizations are at least as important. After all, without the activities of industrial firms, commercial organizations, clubs, churches, political parties, etc. no civil society will function properly. Consequently,

the military should do well not to look for CIMIC-partners exclusively in the public realm. Representing their governments, the military sometimes too easily focus their attention on whom they recognize and value as civilian colleagues. Understandable as this tendency perhaps may be, the military should be wary of neglecting (or even cold-shouldering) civilians from the non-governmental sphere. In the long run this policy - intentional or not - harms the prospects of reconstruction, which is after all the aim of CIMIC.

In this context yet another point should be stressed. Beside its one-sidedness CIMIC is in principle characterized by 'self-destruction'. When they perform their role properly, the military will in the end make themselves superfluous. Their job is not to stay and become indispensable, but to leave the troubled area as soon as possible. They should, consequently, grab every opportunity that might hasten their departure. Cooperation with representatives of the private sector can very well be one of the means to accomplish this. Economic recovery, for instance, is sometimes not properly looked after by government officials. In that case, the military do well not to exclude private businessmen from their range of local contacts. Finally, it is noteworthy that in a few instances *CIMIC* can be a misnomer. The concept presupposes the presence of civilians, able and willing to enter into relations with the military. This presence, however, is not self-evident. Sometimes, the breakdown of government and society is almost complete, leaving the military no civilian counterpart with which to start a fruitful cooperation. Another possibility is that able civilians are present but, because of their links with organized crime or a criminal régime, are unacceptable for CIMIC. Under these circumstances the military cannot avoid standing in for the missing or unsavoury civilians. When there is no one to co-operate with, there is no substitute for *military government*.

The last few years CIMIC has turned out to be an indispensable instrument in the tool kit of *peace support operations*. The preoccupation with these missions and the many problems they give rise to, has sometimes led to the view that CIMIC is a quite new phenomenon. The popularity among students of international relations and strategy of the concept of *failed states* (and of *failed cities*) has added to this view. After all, over the past few hundred years states have shown an unmistakable tendency to centralize and grow. Failure and disintegration of states seem to be recent developments, and this conclusion is without much further consideration extended to CIMIC. The magnitude of the problems accompanying peace support operations should not lead us to believe, however, that these phenomena were unheard of in the past. To be sure, every stage in the development of states, societies, and international relations brings forth its own peculiarities. CIMIC now will be different from what it meant to former generations. Still, it is important to realize that the relevancy of the concept is not confined to the last few years. On the contrary, CIMIC can boast rather deep roots, and it will certainly do no harm to see our present-day problems in the light of past experiences and problems. Some historical knowledge about these matters is indeed indispensable to arrive at a better understanding of what CIMIC can and cannot do. Without this knowledge one can easily ask the wrong questions or concentrate on the wrong issues. It is only natural that in the course of the twentieth century the importance and exact meaning of CIMIC have undergone several changes.

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- ¹ Admiral Smith quoted in Dutch Army Publication, Operational Staff, Chief of the Army, Section Lessons Learned, CIMIC, Publication no. 7: p. 3, January 2000
- ² The United States armed forces work with the concept of Civil Affairs, which will be dealt with later.
- ³ For the NATO definition, see: <http://www.nato.int/ims/docu/mc411-1-e.htm>.
- ⁴ For the consequences of peace support operations on the combat readiness of military personnel, see: U.S. Government Accounting Office, 'Military Operations: Impact of Operations Other Than War on the Services vary', May 1999, GAO/NSIAD-99-69, to be found on the website of the U.S. Government Accounting Office (www.gao.gov).
- ⁵ For a more extensive debate of the strategic dimension of contemporary CIMIC, see: R.V.A. Janssens, 'Strategische Belangen bij Vredesoperaties: Politici, Militairen en Hulpverleners en hun rol in CIMIC' [Strategic Interests in Peace Support Operations: Politicians, Soldiers and Aid Workers], in: *Marineblad*, 2000 / 4: pp. 138-144, and R.V.A. Janssens, 'De Koninklijke Marine en CIMIC: Nieuw en Vertrouwd', [The Royal Netherlands Navy and CIMIC: New and Familiar], in: *Marineblad*, 2002 / 1: pp. 11-16.
- ⁶ This, too, is discussed in detail in the later volumes of *Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereldoorlog* [The Kingdom of the Netherlands during World War II].
- ⁷ For the situation in South East Asia: S. Woodburn Kirby, *The War against Japan, Vol. V. The Surrender of Japan* (London, 1969), Part 3, E.A.C. in the Post-War Period (August 1945 - November 1946): pp. 223-375.
- ⁸ See: <http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html>.
- ⁹ For the Brahimi report: Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, August 17, 2000, http://www.un.org/peace/report/peace_operations.